Design and Evaluation of A Fault Tolerant Mobile Agent System

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Abstract

Improving the survivability of mobile agents in the presence of agent server failures with unreliable underlying networks is a challenging issue. In this paper, we address a fault tolerance approach of deploying cooperating agents to detect server and agent failures as well as to recover services in mobile agent systems. Three types of agents are involved, which are the actual agent, the witness agent and the probe. We introduce a failure detection and recovery protocol by employing a message-passing mechanism among these three kinds of agents. Different failure scenarios and their corresponding recovery procedures are discussed. Further, Stochastic Petri Net models for the proposed approach are developed and survivability evaluations through simulation are conducted.

Index Terms

Mobile agent, Witness agent, Probe, Witnessing dependency, Fault tolerance, Stochastic Petri Net
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I. INTRODUCTION

Mobile agents are autonomous software objects capable of actively migrating from one server to another in a computer network and executing on behalf of a network user. When an agent travels to another server, its code, data as well as execution state are captured and transferred to the next server. Because a mobile agent moves to resource-containing servers to access them locally, it is not required to transfer multiple requests and responses across congested network links, thus the overall performance becomes more efficiently. Consequently, mobile agents create a new paradigm for data exchange and resource sharing in rapidly growing and continuously changing computer networks. It has being exploited in electronic commerce, information retrieval, network and workflow management, etc. Many academic and commercial systems provide mobile agent execution environments, such as Aglets, Agent TCL, Concordia, Grasshopper, Mole, Odyssey and Voyager.

In a distributed system any software or hardware components may be subject to failures. A mobile agent is lost when its hosting agent server crashes during its execution, or it may be dropped in congested networks. Therefore, survivability as well as fault tolerance are vital issues for the deployment of mobile agent systems. A number of research work has been done in these areas. Pleisch et al. adopt the utilization of replication as well as masking [1]. The proposed idea employs replicated servers to mask failures. Dalmeijer et al. [2] utilize a checkpoint manager to monitor all agents, which is responsible to keep track of all the agents and to restart the lost agents. Osman et al. [3] analyze the execution model of agent platforms to develop a pragmatic framework for agent systems fault tolerance, which deploys a communication-pair-independent checkpointing strategy. Pears et al. [4] utilize two exception handling approaches to maintain the availability of mobile agents, which operate at different servers. Silva et al. [5] present a set of fault tolerance techniques, such as fault detection, checkpointing and restart, software rejuvenation, and reconfigurable itinerary. The authors also discuss the issues of network partitions.
Our approach [6] is rooted from the approach suggested in [7]. We distinguish three types of agents. One type is the common mobile agent which performs the required computations for its owners. We name it the actual agent. The second type of agent monitors the actual agent and detects whether it is lost. We call this type of agent the witness agent. The last type is the probe who is responsible to recover the failed actual agent and witness agents. A peer-to-peer message passing mechanism stands between the actual agent and the witness agents to perform failure detection and recovery through time-bounded information exchange. In addition to the introductions of the witness agent, the probe and the messages passing mechanism, we need to log the actions performed by the actual agent. Because when failures occur, we need to abort uncommitted actions when we perform rollback recovery [8]. Moreover, we employ checkpointed data [2] to recover the lost actual agent.

II. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND PROTOCOL DESIGN

Different server failure detection and recovery strategies have been exploited in the literature, which could bring the failed server back to work; however, it cannot recover the lost agent if the actual agent resides on the failed server when the failure occurs. Therefore, we need a more advanced approach to re-initialize the lost agent.

Fig. 1 shows the overall design of the agent server architecture which is capable of recovering a lost agent. The agent server should provide three types of stable storage for logs, checkpoints and messages, respectively. First, every server logs the actions performed by an agent. The logged information is vital for failure detection as well as recovery. Also, the hosting servers log which objects have been updated. When a server failure occurs, we should recover the lost agent due to the failure; however, an agent contains its internal data, which may be lost due to the failure. Moreover, if we allow the agent to renew its computation from the starting point of its itinerary, the exactly-once property will be violated. Therefore, we have to checkpoint the data of an agent, thus require a permanent storage to store the checkpointed data. Furthermore, our agent failure detection and recovery protocol is based on message passing as well as message logging. In order to detect and recover the failures of an actual agent, we designate another type of agent, namely the witness agent, to monitor whether the actual agent is alive or dead. When the actual agent completes its dedicated work on a server and starts to continue its journey to the next server, it spawns a witness agent at the current server. In addition to the witness agent, we design
a communication mechanism between agents and servers.

Assume that, currently, the actual agent has just arrived at server $S_i$ while the witness agent has been spawned at server $S_{i-1}$ before the actual agent leaves server $S_{i-1}$. We denote the actual agent as $\alpha$ and the witness agent as $\omega_{i-1}$.

As the actual agent plays an active role in our proposed protocol, we discuss its activity first. Fig. 1 shows the action flow performed by the actual agent $\alpha$ at server $S_i$. After $\alpha$ has arrived at $S_i$, it immediately writes an arrival entry, $\log^{i}_{\text{arrive}}$, into the logs on the permanent storage in $S_i$ [Step (1)]. The purpose of this log entry is to provide an evidence that $\alpha$ has successfully landed on this server. Next, $\alpha$ informs $\omega_{i-1}$ that it has arrived at $S_i$ safely by sending a message, $msg^{i}_{\text{arrive}}$, to $S_{i-1}$ [Step (2)]. $S_{i-1}$ keeps the received message in its message box. Then, $\alpha$ performs its dedicated tasks at $S_i$. When it finishes, it immediately checkpoints its internal data [Step (3)]. We assume that the checkpointing action is one of the computations of the actual agent. That is, if the checkpointing action fails, the actual agent will abort the whole transaction. This is an important step since this property guarantees that the checkpointed data will be available if the actual agent has already finished computing. Moreover, it is essential for the recovery of the lost actual agent. After that $\alpha$ logs another entry $\log^{i}_{\text{leave}}$ in $S_i$ [Step (4)]. This log entry expresses that $\alpha$ has completed its computation and is ready to travel to the next server $S_{i+1}$. In
the next step, $\alpha$ sends $\omega_{i-1}$ another message, $msg^i_{\text{leave}}$, in order to inform $\omega_{i-1}$ that $\alpha$ is ready to leave $S_i$ [Step (5)]. After sending the leave message, $\alpha$ spawns a new witness agent at the current server [Step (6)]. At last, $\alpha$ leaves $S_i$ and travels to $S_{i+1}$. The procedure goes on until $\alpha$ reaches the last destination in its itinerary.

On the other hand, the witness agent $\omega_{i-1}$ is more passive than the actual agent in this protocol. It does not send any messages to the actual agent. Instead, it simply waits to receive messages from the local mailbox first. Two messages are expected: one is $msg^i_{\text{arrive}}$ and the other is $msg^i_{\text{leave}}$. One advantage of receiving these two types of messages through a mailbox is that the mailbox provides a history record that these messages have arrived at this server. Additionally, the mailbox provides a mechanism to shuffle messages and only lets $msg^i_{\text{arrive}}$ pass before $msg^i_{\text{leave}}$. Therefore, if the messages are out-of-order, $msg^i_{\text{leave}}$ will be kept in the permanent storage and will not be consumed by $\omega_{i-1}$. The message record in the mailbox will be utilized in recovering the lost witness agent and actual agent. After receiving these two indirect messages, $\omega_{i-1}$ waits for the direct heartbeat message, $msg^i_{\text{alive}}$, which is sent by the witness agent at server $S_i$. This message testifies the liveness of $\omega_i$. Therefore, a witness agent will undergo three states after being spawned, shown in Fig. 2.

### III. Agent Failure Detection and Recovery

The purpose of the introductions of the log entries, $log^i_{\text{arrive}}$ and $log^i_{\text{leave}}$, and the messages, $msg^i_{\text{arrive}}$ and $msg^i_{\text{leave}}$, is to guarantee that the actual agent has finished up to a certain point of
its execution. If a server failure occurs between a log entry and its corresponding message, we can determine when and where the actual agent fails. We assume that there will be no hardware failures such that the log entries cannot be recorded in the permanent storage. However, other kinds of failures like software faults in the mobile agents or in the mobile agent platforms may occur. In the following subsections, we will cover different types of failures including the loss of the actual agent and the loss of the witness agents.

A. $\omega_{i-1}$ fails to receive $msg_{\text{arrive}}^i$

The cases that the witness agent at server $S_{i-1}$, $\omega_{i-1}$, fails to receive $msg_{\text{arrive}}^i$ include:

(a) The message is lost due to an unreliable network;
(b) The message arrives after the timeout period of $\omega_{i-1}$;
(c) $\alpha$ is dead when it is ready to leave $S_{i-1}$ and heading for $S_i$;
(d) $\alpha$ is dead when it has just arrived at $S_i$ without logging;
(e) $\alpha$ is dead when it has just arrived at $S_i$ with logging.

By utilizing the arrival entry logged in $S_i$, $log_{\text{arrive}}^i$, we can solve the first two problems. In these two cases, the actual agent does not die and $log_{\text{arrive}}^i$ is a proof for the existence of $\alpha$ inside $S_i$. The witness agent can then send out a probe $\rho_i$, another agent, to search for $log_{\text{arrive}}^i$ in $S_i$. If found, $\rho_i$ re-transmits $msg_{\text{arrive}}^i$ in order to recover the lost or delayed message.

If $\omega_{i-1}$ fails to receive $msg_{\text{arrive}}^i$ because of the loss of the actual agent, we may have the problem of missing detection when, in case (e), the probe can find $log_{\text{arrive}}^i$ and wrongly determines that the actual agent is still alive, and thus terminates itself prematurely. This case will be discussed in the next subsection.

If the failure is caused by cases (c) or (d), the probe will not be able to find $log_{\text{arrive}}^i$ in $S_i$. Then, we should recover the lost actual agent by utilizing the checkpointed data stored in $S_{i-1}$. Therefore, the probe is required to carry along the checkpointed data when it travels to $S_i$.

Fig. 3 shows the execution steps to detect agent failures when the witness agent fails to receive $msg_{\text{arrive}}^i$. $\omega_{i-1}$ waits for the message $msg_{\text{arrive}}^i$ with a configurable timeout period. If the timeout period is reached, it creates the probe $\rho_i$. $\rho_i$ then travels to $S_i$ [Step (1)]. Since it may be required to recover a lost agent, it travels with the checkpointed data [Step (2)]. Upon arriving at $S_i$, it searches the log file in $S_i$ for the entry $log_{\text{arrive}}^i$ [Step (3)]. If $log_{\text{arrive}}^i$ is found, it re-transmits $msg_{\text{arrive}}^i$ [Step (4)]. If the log entry is not found, $\rho_i$ will recover $\alpha$ in $S_i$ by using
(1) the witness agent spawns a probe, which travels to $S_i$.
(2) The probe is carrying the checkpointed data.
(3) The probe inspects the log in $S_i$.
(4) If log $i$ arrive is found, then $msg_{\text{arrive}}^i$ is re-transmitted to $S_{i-1}$.
(5) If not, recover the agent from the checkpointed data.

Fig. 3. Recovery steps when $\omega_{i-1}$ fails to receive $msg_{\text{arrive}}^i$.

the piggyback checkpointed data [Step (5)]. Finally, the recovered actual agent at $S_i$ will send
the message $msg_{\text{arrive}}^i$. Note that we recover the lost actual agent in $S_i$ instead of $S_{i-1}$ because
when $\rho_i$ detects that a recovery is required, we can immediately recover that actual agent in $S_i$.
If we perform the recovery in $S_{i-1}$, $\rho_i$ has to send a message to $S_{i-1}$ in order to inform $\omega_{i-1}$
that an agent recovery is required. This introduces a risk of losing the critical message.

When $\omega_{i-1}$ sends out $\rho_i$, it waits for another timeout period. This is important since probe $\rho_i$
may lose, the message that is re-transmitted from $S_i$ may be lost again, or another successive
failure may strike $S_i$. Such a failure may terminate both the probe $\rho_i$ and the just-recovered
actual agent. Therefore, $\omega_{i-1}$ should wait until the message $msg_{\text{arrive}}^i$ arrives.

Note that it is possible that $\rho_i$ reaches $S_i$ while $\alpha$ is still on the way. However, the occurrence
probability of this case should be low. Since both $\alpha$ and $\rho_i$ have to travel from $S_{i-1}$ to $S_i$ in the
same network, they suffer from more or less the same network latency. Although there may be
many routes from $S_{i-1}$ to $S_i$, we can set the timeout of $\omega_{i-1}$ to be large enough to overcome
the difference of speeds among these routes.

B. $\omega_{i-1}$ fails to receive $msg_{\text{leave}}^i$

The reasons that $\omega_{i-1}$ fails to receive $msg_{\text{leave}}^i$ are listed as follows:

(a) The message is lost due to an unreliable network;
(b) The message arrives after the timeout period of $\omega_{i-1}$;
(c) $\alpha$ is dead when it has just sent the message $msg_{arrive}^i$;
(d) $\alpha$ is dead when it has just logged the entry $log_{leave}^i$;
(e) $\alpha$ is dead when it has spawned the witness agent $\omega_i$.

If the failure occurs because of the first two reasons, it can be solved in a similar way as that in the previous subsection. $\omega_{i-1}$ will send a probe, again denoted as $\rho_i$, with a different task to search for $log_{leave}^i$ in the log file of $S_i$. We may also face the missing detection problem if the reason of the failures is cases (d) or (e). The solution to case (d) will be discussed in the subsection III-C by utilizing the witness agent monitoring mechanism. For case (e), it becomes the same case as $\omega_i$ cannot receive $msg_{arrive}^{i+1}$, which has been discussed in the previous subsection.

For case (c), we handle it by detecting whether $log_{leave}^i$ exists or not. If $log_{leave}^i$ is absent, it implies that the actual agent is lost while performing its computation. Case (e) of the previous subsection can be categorized as this case. Because we could expect that the witness agent $\omega_{i-1}$ will not receive $msg_{leave}^i$ after the loss of $\alpha$. In this case, since the actual agent is lost, its partially-completed task should be undone. Therefore, it is required to rollback those operations by the method proposed in [8] in order to preserve the data consistency in $S_i$. We treat the whole computation process as a single transaction. Since the transaction is not committed, we have to abort all the actions which have been executed in this transaction. We employ the log in $S_i$ to recover the data inside $S_i$. The rollback recovery is not done by the probe $\rho_i$. Instead, it is performed during the recovery of the server. Therefore, when the probe cannot find the log entry $log_{leave}^i$, it can immediately use the checkpointed data to recover the actual agent. After the recovery is completed, the recovered actual agent continues to perform its computation in $S_i$. This simplifies the implementation of the agent failure detection mechanism. The execution steps of the probe when $msg_{leave}^i$ is missing is very similar to the steps in Fig. 3. Note again the recovery of the actual agent takes place in the server where the actual agent is expected to be hosted, i.e., $S_i$.

C. Failures of witness agents and the recovery strategy

The witness agent at server $S_i$, $\omega_i$, is spawned by the actual agent $\alpha$ after it logs the entry $log_{leave}^i$ and before it moves to the next server $S_{i+1}$. The reason of engaging this witness agent
spawning strategy instead of letting the lagged witness $\omega_{i-1}$ moves forward to server $S_i$ is to reduce the network communication, thus minimizing the chances of agent loss introduced by link failures, and to create a chain of witness agents.

Before the actual agent completes its itinerary, there are witness agents spawned along the itinerary of the actual agent. The most recently created witness agent is monitoring the actual agent; on the other hand, the older witness agents are responsible for monitoring the witness agent that is just one server closer to the actual agent in its itinerary. That is

$$\omega_0 \rightarrow \omega_1 \rightarrow \omega_2 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow \omega_{i-1} \rightarrow \omega_i \rightarrow \alpha,$$

where “$\rightarrow$” represents the monitoring relation. We introduce a server called home, i.e., the machine of the agent owner. The home server is responsible for transmitting agents when the agents start travelling as well as for receiving agents when they finish travelling on the network. This home server is denoted as $S_0$. Therefore, $\omega_0$ denotes the witness agent resides at the home server. We name the above dependency the witnessing dependency. This dependency cannot be broken, otherwise, no witness agent will monitor the actual agent eventually. In order to preserve the witnessing dependency, the witness agents that are not monitoring the actual agent periodically receive heartbeat messages from its forward witness agent. That is, $\omega_i$ sends a periodic message, $msg_{\text{alive}}^i$, to $\omega_{i-1}$ in order to let $\omega_{i-1}$ know that $\omega_i$ is alive. When $\omega_{i-1}$ cannot receive $msg_{\text{alive}}^i$ from $\omega_i$, the reasons may be:

(a) The network is congested or unreliable;
(b) The system load of $S_i$ is too high;
(c) $\omega_i$ is not created or is dead.

No matter what the reason of the failure is, $\omega_{i-1}$ can always assume that $\omega_i$ is dead. These cases have included case (d) in Subsection III-B. After timeout, $\omega_{i-1}$ will send a probe $\rho_i$ to $S_i$ to spawn a new witness agent in order to replace the lost witness agent in $S_i$. Since there is no special data stored in the witness agent except the agent itinerary, this type of probe does not need to carry the checkpointed data. Because there exists a probability of false detection due to cases (a) and (b), when $\rho_i$ arrives at $S_i$, it first checks whether the witness agent is still alive. If no witness agent exists, it initializes a new witness agent. This newly-created witness agent will re-send the message $msg_{\text{alive}}^i$ to $\omega_{i-1}$; otherwise, $\rho_i$ just disposes itself.

Fig. 4 illustrates a recovery procedure of witness agent failure. If $\alpha$ is in $S_i$, then $\omega_{i-1}$ is
monitoring \(\alpha\), and \(\omega_{i-2}\) is monitoring \(\omega_{i-1}\). Assuming we have the following failure sequence: \(S_{i-1}\) crashes first and then \(S_i\) crashes. Since \(S_{i-1}\) crashes, \(\omega_{i-1}\) is lost, hence no one monitors \(\alpha\). If no one recovers \(\omega_{i-1}\), then no one can recover \(\alpha\) after \(S_i\) crashes. This is not desirable. Therefore, we need a mechanism to monitor and recover the failed witness agents. This is achieved by preserving the witnessing dependency: the recovery of \(\omega_{i-1}\) can be performed by \(\omega_{i-2}\), so that eventually \(\alpha\) can be recovered by \(\omega_{i-1}\). Note that there are other more complex scenarios, but as long as the witnessing dependency is preserved, the agent failure detection and recovery can always be achieved.

D. Simplification of the witnessing dependency

To keep the witnessing dependency, witness agents are created in the itinerary and heartbeat messages are exchanged between witness agents. This procedure consumes a lot of resources along the itinerary of the actual agent. If, however, we assume that no \(k\) or more servers can fail at the same period of time, we can simplify our mechanism by shortening the witnessing dependency through keeping the witness length less than or equal to \(k\). If the actual agent \(\alpha\) is now at server \(S_i\), the simplified dependency then becomes:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{if } (i \leq k) & \quad \omega_0 \rightarrow \omega_1 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow \omega_{i-1} \rightarrow \alpha \\
\text{else} & \quad \omega_{i-k} \rightarrow \omega_{i-k+1} \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow \omega_{i-1} \rightarrow \alpha,
\end{align*}
\]

where “\(\rightarrow\)” represents the monitoring relation. Since no more than \(k\) servers can fail simultaneously, \(k\) witness agents are sufficient to guarantee the availability of the actual agent. When a failure occurs in \(S_i\), \(\omega_{i-1}\) can recover \(\alpha\) after the server is restarted. When a failure strikes \(S_j\),
$i-k < j < i$, $\omega_{j-1}$ will recover $\omega_j$. When a failure occurs in $S_{i-k}$, as $\omega_{i-k}$ cannot be recovered, the length of witnessing dependency is reduced by 1. However, when $\alpha$ travels to $S_{i+1}$, a new witness agent $\omega_i$ will be created and a new dependency involving $\omega_{i-1}, \omega_i,$ and $\alpha$ will be formed, thus the witnessing dependency resumes its length of $k$. Finally, when $\alpha$ successfully logs the entry $\log_{\text{arrive}}^{i+1}$, we can terminate $\omega_{i-k}$ by sending a message, $\text{msg}_{\text{kill}}^{i+1}$, from $S_{i+1}$ to $S_{i-k}$.

IV. Stochastic Petri Net Models and Experimental Results

With the proposed agent failure detection and recovery mechanism, we evaluate its improvement on agent survivability through Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) and simulation [9]. We denote a mobile agent system without any fault tolerance as Level 0. For comparison, we introduce a server failure detection and recovery mechanism. Before the actual agent leaves the current server, it tests whether or not its next destination server is alive. If yes, it moves to it; otherwise, it will stay at the current server until the next server comes back to work. If a mobile agent system engages this server failure detection and recovery strategy, it is at Level 1. If it additionally embeds the agent failure detection and recovery, it goes up to Level 2. We define the metric, the agent survivability, as the successful ratio of actual agents in completing their scheduled round-trip journeys in a network of agent servers.

A. SPN models

Fig. 5 shows the SPN that models the mobile agent system at Level 2. SPNs for Levels 0 and 1 are subsets of the SPN for Level 2, so we omit them. The right dashed-line box manifests the state transitions of the actual agent at a server. Transitions $t_{\alpha.m}, t_{\text{log}}, t_{\alpha.p}, t_{\text{leave}}$ and $t_{\text{spawn}}$ are timed transitions, which model the time spent on travelling between two servers, the time to log the arrival entry, the required computation time inside a server, the time to log the leave entry and the time to spawn a witness agent, respectively. The right un-boxed places and transitions are for the server itself. $t_{\text{failure}}$ models the time to a failure and $t_{\text{recovery}}$ is the time required to perform a recovery. Here instant failure detection is assumed. A more realistic round-robin failure detection approach could also be modelled [6]. When a token is inside place $p_{\text{server}}$, the server is available; however, if there is no token inside that place, the server fails, and all agents inside that server are lost. We utilize inhibitor arcs and guard arcs to model these phenomena. The guard arc from $p_{\text{server}}$ to $t_{\alpha.m}$ prevents the actual agent from moving to the server when it fails. The upper-left
dashed-line box shows the witness agent’s state transitions. Three states, waiting for the arrival, leave and heartbeat messages, are clearly represented. The middle non-boxed area is for the probe. Three types of probes will be dispatched, which are for retrieving the arrival message, for retrieving the leave message, and for recovering a witness agent. The places in the lower-left dashed-line box represent sending the arrival and leave messages to a witness agent, which are shared by the actual agent and the probe. After a server recovers from a failure, places \( p_{l,a} \), \( p_{l,l} \), \( p_{m,a} \) and \( p_{m,l} \) will be initialized with a token if their corresponding logs and messages are present.

Fig. 5 only shows different agents’ behaviors in one server. We can put several servers together to form a chain, which represents the itinerary of an actual agent and the witnessing dependency.

B. Experimental results

Our experiments are carried out by simulations developed with C-Sim [10]. Some parameters are given here: the network transmission rate for all agents is 100, and for messages is 200;
the server repair rate $t_{s,r} = 0.1$; all message log rates are 100; the arrival, leave and heartbeat messages bound times are 1, 100, and 20, respectively; and the heartbeat interval is 5. We carry out the experiments by using different itineraries with various number of servers. These experiments illustrate how the agent survivability is improved.

The results of using the C-Sim implementation with different server failure rates and job completion rates are shown in Fig. 6. For each parameter pair, we conduct six simulations, one for Level 0, one for Level 1, and the other four for Level 2 with different $k$, the length of witness agents. All sub-figures (a) show that the agent survivability decreases progressively as the number of servers increases. It is reasonable since the chance of waiting for the recovery of a failed server increases, the agent loss probability will also go up while the agent is waiting. The agent failure detection and recovery mechanism achieves relatively higher survivability than other two levels. The improvement becomes more significant as the number of servers and the length of witness agents increase. Therefore, to achieve high percentage of successful round-trip agent travels with more servers, we should increase the number of witness agent correspondingly.

An unexpected result is that after engaging the server failure detection and recovery approach, the completed agents percentage is, however, less than that of without engaging any fault tolerance mechanisms. We know that in both these levels, when the actual agent is lost, no way is provided to recover it. Therefore, if the agent finishes its journey more quickly, its loss probability is less. After engaging the server failure detection and recovery, the actual agent spends more time in the system because it should wait at its current server when its next server is unavailable. Consequently, its loss chance becomes higher. Even the agent failure detection and recovery with small number of witness agent is employed, this statement is also true. By comparing Fig. 6(I-a) and (II-a), we note that the higher the failure rate is, the higher the agent loss probability is. However, if an agent could complete its dedicated work at each server more quickly (Fig. 6(III-a)), the survivability will increase. This implies that under unreliable systems, the actual agent should complete its task as fast as it can.

We know that Level 2 is achieved by engaging witness agents and probes. All sub-figures (b) and (c) show what the cost it has to pay. All sub-figures (b) show the number of created witness agent with Level 2, which increases linearly with the number of servers. The higher the number of required witness agents $k$ is, the more witness agents will be created. Sub-figures (c) show the number of probes generated during agent execution. Note that the higher percentage of
completed agent is achieved at the cost of more witness agents and probes spawned. It indicates that as the itinerary becomes longer, more extra witness agents and probes will be required, and consequently the complexity of the system is increased. With these simulation results, we also note there exists a trade-off between the achieved survivability and the overhead cost.

V. CONCLUSION

Enhancing the agent survivability in a failure-prone mobile agent system should be exploited in order to create a more reliable agent deployment environment. Different approaches have been
studied, such as server replication, checkpointing and rollback recovery, as well as message-based mechanisms. We propose a fault tolerant mobile agent framework which not only integrates those traditional fault tolerance strategies but also employs witness agents and probes to detect and recover server and agent failures. Spawned witness agents form a witnessing dependency which is maintained by heartbeat messages sent backward. Failures of agents are recovered through utilizing probes. An SPN model for the proposed mechanism is constructed and simulations are conducted to evaluate the agent survivability and the numbers of witness agents and probes created for failure recovery. Simulation results show that our proposed agent detection and recovery approach improves the agent survivability. However, the improvement in agent survivability is achieved by spending more time and space resources. Therefore, how to achieve the expected agent survivability with affordable cost is a trade-off issue and should be investigated in the future.

REFERENCES

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