16.1 Introduction

Previous chapters discuss the opportunities and benefits of SRE throughout the entire life cycle, from requirements determination through design, implementation, testing, delivery, and operations. Properly applied, SRE is an important positive influence on the ultimate quality of all life-cycle products. The set of life-cycle activities and artifacts, together with their attributes and interrelationships, that are related to reliability* comprise what we here refer to as the reliability process. The artifacts of the software life cycle include documents, reports, manuals, plans, code, configuration data, test data, ancillary data, and all other tangible products.

Software reliability is dynamic and stochastic. In a new or upgraded product, it begins at a low figure with respect to its new intended usage and ultimately reaches a figure near unity in maturity. The exact value of product reliability, however, is never precisely known at any point in its lifetime.

The software reliability models described in Chap. 3 attempt to assess expected reliability or future operability using observed failure data and statistical inference techniques. Most of these treat only the exposure and handling of failures during testing or operations. They are restricted in their life-cycle scope and adaptability to general use

* Suitable extensions of the concepts of this chapter may also apply to simulation of other quality profiles, such as availability.
for a number of reasons, including their foundation on oversimplified assumptions and their primary focus on testing and operations phases.

Modelers have traditionally imposed certain simplifying assumptions in order to obtain closed-form, idealized approximations of software reliability. Some modelers may have relaxed an assumption here or there in attempts to provide more generality, but as models become more and more realistic, the likelihood of obtaining simple analytic solutions plunges to impossibility.

This situation is not a roadblock to software reliability modeling, but perhaps a boon, in that it forces us to apply modern technology to the problem. Computer models are not subject to the oversimplifications required to obtain closed-form results. Numerical methods can cope with models having very realistic and complex representations of project processes, software artifacts, and the development and operational environments.

Reliability models attempt to capture the structure and interrelationships among artifacts, activities, resources, quality, and time. However, this chapter is mainly about computational techniques for modeling reliability behavior. It does not present a tool for operational situations that you may immediately apply off-the-shelf. It does present concepts for generalized tools that mirror reliability processes. We hope that the material presented will demonstrate the power, flexibility, and potential benefits that simulation techniques offer, together with methods for representing artifacts, activities, and events of the process, and techniques for computation.

16.2 Reliability Simulation

A simulation model describes a system being characterized in terms of its artifacts, events, interrelationships, and interactions in such a way that one may perform experiments on the model, rather than on the system itself, ideally with indistinguishable results.

Simulation presents a particularly attractive computational alternative for investigating software reliability because it averts the need for overly restrictive assumptions and because it can model a wider range of reliability phenomena than mathematical analyses can cope with. Simulation does not require that test coverage be uniform, or that a particular fault-to-failure relationship exist, or that failures occur independently, if these are not actually the case.

But power and generality are ineffective where ignorance reigns. Scientific philosophy teaches us to seek the simplest models that explain poorly understood phenomena. For example, when we do not understand how fault attributes relate to consequent failures, we may as
well simplify the model by assuming that faults produce independent failures, at least until our experiments prove otherwise.

But objective validation of even a simple reliability model may be problematic, because controlled experiments, while easy to simulate, will be impossible to conduct in practice. However, if we can build an overall model upon simple and plausible submodels that together integrate cleanly to simulate the phenomenon under study, then we may gain some aggregate trust from the combined levels of confidence we may have in the constituent submodels.

16.2.1 The need for dynamic simulation

Reliability modeling ultimately requires good data. But software projects do not always collect data sets that are comprehensive, complete, or consistent enough for effective modeling research or model application. Additionally, industrial organizations are reluctant to release their reliability data for use by outside parties. Further, data required for software reliability modeling in general, and execution time models in particular, seem to be even more difficult to collect than other types of software engineering data. Even when data are available, they are rarely suitable for isolation of individual reliability drivers.

In practicality, isolating the effects of various driving factors in the life cycle requires exploring a variety of scenarios "with other factors being the same." But no real software project can afford to do the same project several times while varying the factors of interest. Even if it could, control and repeatability of factors would, at best, be questionable. A project may attempt, of course, to utilize data from past experiences, "properly adjusted" to appear as if earlier realizations of the current project were available. However, in view of the current scarcity of good, consistent data, this may not be realistic.

Reliability modelers thus never have the real opportunity to observe several realizations of the same software project. Nor are they provided with data that faithfully match the assumptions of their models. Nor are they able to probe into the underlying error and failure mechanisms in a controlled way. Rather, they are faced not only with the problem of guessing the form and particulars of the underlying random processes from the scant, uncertain data they possess, but also with the problem of best forecasting future reliability using those data.

Since good data sets are so scarce, one purpose of simulation is to supply carefully controlled, homogeneous data or software artifacts having known characteristics for use in evaluating the various assumptions upon which existing reliability models have been built. Since actual software artifacts (such as faults in computer programs) and processes (such as failure and fault removal) often violate the
assumptions of analytic software reliability models, simulation can perhaps provide a better understanding of such assumptions and may even lead to a better explanation of why some analytic models work well in spite of such violations.

But while simulation may be useful for creating data sets for studying other, more conventional reliability models, it cannot provide the necessary attributes of the phenomena being modeled without real information derived from real data collected from real projects, past and present.

A second use of simulation, then, is in forecasting the driving influences of a real project. Models that can faithfully portray the relative* consequences of various proposed alternatives can potentially assess the relative advantages of the candidates. Once a project sufficiently characterizes its processes, artifacts, and utilization of resources, then trade-offs can indicate the best hopes for project success.

Simulation can mimic key characteristics of the processes that create, validate, and revise documents and code. It can mimic faulty observation of a failure when one has, in fact, occurred, and, additionally, can mimic system outages due to failures. Furthermore, simulation can distinguish faults that have been removed from those that have not, and thus can readily reproduce multiple failures due to the same asset unrepaired fault. Some reliability subprocesses may be sensitive to the passage of execution time (e.g., operational failures), while others may depend on wall-clock, or calendar, time (e.g., project phases); still others may depend on the amount of human effort expended (e.g., fault repair) or on the number of test cases applied. A simulator can relate model-pertinent resource dependencies to a common base via resource schedules, such as workforce loading and computer utilization profiles.

16.2.2 Dynamic simulation approaches

*Simulation in this chapter refers to the technique of imitating the character of an object or process in a way that permits one to make quantified inferences about the real object or process. A dynamic simulation is one whose inputs and observables are events and parameter values, either continuous or discrete, that vary over time. The formal characterization of the object or process is the model under study.

When the form of the model changes over time, adapting to actual data from an evolving project, the simulation is trace-driven. If parameters and interrelationships are static, without trace data, the simulation is self-driven.

* Absolute accuracy is not required for many trade-off studies. Factors which remain the same for all alternative choices do not affect the relative advantage analyses.
The observables of interest in reliability engineering are usually discrete integer-valued quantities (e.g., counts of errors, defects, faults, failures, lines of code) that occur, or are present, as time progresses. Studies of reliability in this context belong to the general field of discrete-event process simulation. Readers wishing to learn more about discrete-event simulation methods may consult [Kreu86].

One approach to simulation produces actual physical artifacts and portions of the environment according to factors and influences believed to typify these entities within a given context. The artifacts and environment are allowed to interact naturally, whereupon we observe the actual flow of occurrences of activities and events. We refer to this approach as artifact-based process simulation, and discuss it in detail in Sec. 16.4.

The other reliability simulation approach [Taus94, Taus96] produces time-line imitations of reliability-related activities and events. No artifacts are actually created, but are modeled parametrically over time. The key to this approach is a rate-based architecture, in which phenomena occur naturally over time as controlled by their frequencies of occurrence, which depend on driving factors such as numbers of faults so far exposed or yet remaining, failure criticality, workforce level, test intensity, and execution time.

Rate-based event simulation is a form of modeling called system dynamics, with the distinction that the observables are discrete events randomly occurring in time. Systems dynamics simulations are traditionally nonstochastic and nondiscrete. But, as will be shown, extension to a discrete stochastic architecture is not difficult. For more information on the systems dynamics technique, see [Robe83].

The use of simulation in the study of software reliability is still formative, experimental, speculative, controversial, and in the proof-of-concept stage. Although simulation models conceptually seem to hold high promise both for creating data to validate conventional models and for generating more realistic forecasts than do analytic models, the evidence to support these hypotheses is currently rather scant and arguable. There are some favorable indications of potential, however, to be discussed.

16.3 The Reliability Process

Because of the lack of good data, past efforts in modeling the reliability process have perhaps been, to some, daunting tasks with uncertain benefits. However, as projects are now becoming increasingly better instrumented, data availability will eventually make this modeling entirely feasible and accurate. Some simulations of portions of the reliability process where measurements are routinely taken are practical.
The reliability process, in generic terms, is a model of the reliability-oriented aspects of software development, operations, and maintenance. Since every project is different, describing an “average” case requires characterizing behavior typical of a class, with variations according to product, situation, environmental, and human factors. In this section, we shall attempt to describe some of the more qualitative aspects of the software reliability process. Quantitative profiles will then follow in subsequent sections.

16.3.1 The nature of the process

Quantities of interest in a project reliability profile include artifacts, errors, inspections, defects, corrections, faults, tests, failures, outages, repairs, validations, retests, and expenditures of resources such as CPU time, staff effort, and schedule time.

A number of factors hold varying degrees of influence over these interrelated elements. Influences include relatively static entities, such as product requirements, as well as other, more dynamic factors, such as the order and concurrency among activities in the process. One would hope to quantify trends, correlations, and perhaps causal factors from data gathered from previous similar projects that would be of current use. Even when formal data are not available, project personnel may often be able to apply their experiences to estimate many of the parameters of the reliability profile needed for modeling.

We will aggregate activities relating to reliability into typical classes of work, such as

1. Construction generates new documentation and code artifacts, while human mistakes inject defects into them. Activities divide into separate documentation and coding subphases, and perhaps further divide into separate work packages for constructed components.

2. Integration combines reusable documentation and code components with new documentation and code components, while human mistakes may create further defects. Integration activities divide into separate documentation and code integration subphases, and perhaps further divide into separate work packages according to the build architecture.

3. Inspection detects defects through static analyses of software artifacts. Inspections also divide into separate document and code subphases mirroring construction. Inspections may fail to recognize defects when encountered.

4. Correction analyzes and removes defects, again in document and code correction subphases. Corrections may be ineffective, and may inject new defects.
5. *Preparation* generates test plans and test cases, and readies them for execution.

6. *Testing* executes test cases, whereupon failures occur. Some failures may escape observation, while others may initiate system outages. Failure criticality determinations are made.

7. *Identification* makes failure-to-fault correspondences and fault category assignments. Each fault may be new or previously encountered. Identification may erroneously identify the cause of a failure.

8. *Repair* removes faults (not necessarily perfectly) and possibly introduces new faults.

9. *Validation* performs inspections and static checks to affirm that repairs are effective, but may err in doing so; it may also detect that certain repairs were ineffective (i.e., the corresponding faults were not totally removed), and may also detect other faults.

10. *Retest* executes test cases to verify whether specified repairs are complete. If not, the defective repair is marked for re-repair. New test cases may be needed. Retests may err in qualifying a fault as repaired.

### 16.3.2 Structures and flows

Work in a project generally flows in the logical precedence of tasks listed above. But some activities may take place concurrently and repeatedly, especially in rapid prototyping, concurrent engineering, and spiral models of development. Models of behavior cannot ignore project paradigms, but must adapt to them.

Events occur and activities take place through the application of resources over intervals of time. No progress in the life cycle results unless activities consume resources. As examples, a code component of 500 lines of code (LOC) may require an average of $W_c$ work hours and $H_c$ CPU hours per LOC to develop, to be expended between the schedule times $t_1$ and $t_2$; testing the component may require $W_t$ work hours to generate and apply test cases and $H_t$ CPU hours per test case to execute, scheduled for the time interval between $t_3$ and $t_4$; and a repair activity may require $W_r$ work hours and $H_r$ CPU hours to complete, during the interval between times $t_5$ and $t_6$.

The project resource schedule is essential for managing the reliability process. It defines the project activities, products, flow of work, and allocation of resources. It thus reflects the planned development methodology, management and engineering decisions, and environment constraints.

Projects may, of course, measure failure profiles and other reliability data without recording the schedule and resource of actual performance
details. However, they will not be able to extract quantitative relationships among reliability and management parameters without these details.

The data essential to a process schedule define the resources and resource levels that are applied throughout the project duration. Schedule items may, for example, appear as tuples, such as

\[(\text{resource, event\_process, rate, units, } t_{\text{begin}}, t_{\text{end}})\]

Together, the items relate the utilization of all resources at each instant of time throughout the process. The tuple specifies that the named \text{event\_process} activity uses the designated \text{resource} at the given application \text{rate} during the designated time interval \((t_{\text{begin}}, t_{\text{end}})\), not to exceed the allocated \text{units} limit.

The \text{rate} defines the amount of \text{resource} consumed per \(dt\) of the \text{event\_process}. If \(dt\) is calendar time and the resource is human effort, the rate is staff level; if the resource is CPU and \(dt\) is in CPU hours, the rate is CPU hours per calendar day. When an \text{event\_process} expends its allocated \text{units}, the effective \text{rate} becomes zero.

Projects typically express schedule information in units of calendar time. If a project includes weekends, holidays, and vacations, then the schedule must either exclude these as inactive periods or else provide compensating rate factors between resource days and calendar time. For example, if a project is idle for two weeks during the winter holiday season, the schedule should not allocate any resources during this time. If a project works only 5 days a week, the resource utilization rate should allocate only \(5/7\)ths of a workday per calendar day. (However, if the project allocates time and resources in weeks, then 5 days is a normal work week, and no rate adjustment is necessary in this case.)

16.3.3 Interdependencies among elements

Causal relationships exist between a project’s input reliability drivers and its resulting reliability profile, in that all development subprocesses consume resources and are driven, perhaps randomly, by other factors of influence.

Quantification of relationships is tantamount to modeling, and is required for simulation. As examples, the degree to which code and documents are inspected correlates with the number and seriousness of faults discovered in testing; the correctness of specifications relates to the correctness of ensuing code; and the seriousness of failures influences when a project will schedule the causal faults for repair.

Some relationships may be generic, while others may be unique to a given project. Some interrelationships may be subtle, while others may
seem more axiomatic. Some of the typical axiomatic generic relationships among reliability profile parameters are:

1. All activities (including outages) consume resources.
2. Code written to missing, incorrect, or volatile specifications will be more faulty than code written to correct, complete, and stable specifications.
3. Tests rely on the existence of test cases. Old test cases rarely expose new faults.
4. The number of faults removed will be less than the number attempted. The attempted removal activity may also create new faults.
5. The number of validated fault removals will not exceed the number of attempts. Validation may erroneously report a fault removed.
6. Retesting usually encounters only failures due to bad fixes.

16.3.4 Software environment characteristics

Software in a test environment performs differently than it will in an operational environment. There are many reasons, more adequately addressed in Chap. 13, why this is the case. Principal reasons among them, however, are differences in configuration, execution purpose, execution scenarios, attitudes toward failures, and orientation of personnel. In brief, testing and operations are different environmentally.

Reliability profiles during test and operations depend on the environments themselves, not just on the test case execution scenarios and values of environment parameters. Although testing may attempt to emulate real operations in certain particulars, we must recognize that the characters of testing and operations are apt to differ significantly.

Predicting failures in differing environments requires, at the least, adaptability of the reliability model to fit configuration, scenario, and previous failure data. Such adaptations must accommodate for differences in hardware, test strategies, loading, database volume, and user training.

16.4 Artifact-Based Simulation

Software developers have long questioned the nature of relationships between software failures and program structure, programming error characteristics, and test strategies. Von Mayrhauser et al. [Mayr91, Mayr92, Mayr93] have performed experiments to investigate such questions, arguing that the extent to which reliability depends merely on
these factors can be measured by generating random programs having the given characteristics, and then observing their failure statistics. It is not important, in this respect, that the programs actually execute to perform useful functions, but merely that they possess the hypothesized properties that "real" programs would have in a given environment.

If the hypothesis is true, then the effects of the various controlled elements under study would be readily discovered. For example, by adjusting code structural characteristics (e.g., size, ratio of branching decisions to loop decisions, and fault distribution) in a controlled set of experiments, we may observe the contributory effects to failure behavior. We may also learn something about the sensitivities of reliability models to their founding assumptions. Such studies would lead practitioners to the best model(s) to use in given situations.

To explore the conjecture, they identified program properties and test strategies to be investigated. Then they performed experiments using automatically generated programs having the given properties, subjected these to the selected test strategies, and measured the reliability results.

Their investigations proceeded using only single-module programs (i.e., ones with no procedure calls), assumed that faults are of only a single type and severity, distributed uniformly throughout the program, and considered only a constant likelihood that a failure results when execution encounters a statement containing a fault.

There is no fundamental limitation in the artifact simulation technique that excludes procedure calls, multiple fault types, and time-dependent statistics. They were excluded in these early experiments to establish basic relationships. Their architecture will support multiple subprograms; faults of various types, severities, and distributions; and time-varying parameters at the later stages of experimentation.

### 16.4.1 Simulator architecture

The reported simulation covers the coding, testing, and debugging portions of the software life cycle. The simulator consists of the following components (see Fig. 16.1).

The code generator uses program design and/or code structural and error characteristics to produce executable code with faults. Code generation is discussed more fully later (Sec. 16.4.1.2). The faults injected into the program cause actual execution failures during testing to occur in such a manner as to be detected by the test harness module, discussed below.

The compiler is an ordinary compiler, the same as an actual project would use. The compiler generates executable code from the generated code and from updates following each of the fault repairs.
The test data generator uses the generated code, together with parameters that select testing strategy, testing criteria, and phase (unit test, integration test, system test, etc.) to produce test input data and testing procedure parameters.

The test harness module applies test data to the simulated system in accordance with the selected test procedures, then detects each failure as it occurs, and categorizes it according to predetermined fault exposure and severity criteria.

The debugger and code repair functions of the simulation locate and repair faults recognized by the test harness, and then reschedule the program for compilation and retesting. The debugger may fail to locate the fault and may either completely or incompletely remove the fault, when located. It may, at times, even introduce new faults. The debugger parameters include inputs to control locatability, severity, completeness, and fault detectability.

Reliability analysis combines the failure data output by the test harness with the residual fault data from the debugger (undetected errors and incorrect repairs) to assess the reliability of the simulated code. This assessment compares failure results with the output of a conventional software reliability model.

16.4.1.1 Simulation inputs. Artifact simulation experiments can vary many aspects of program construction and testing to investigate the effect of static properties on dynamic behavior. Inputs may include those which characterize code structure, coding errors, test input data, test conduct, failure characteristics, debugging effectiveness, and computing environment.

The investigated code structure parameters pertained to control flow, data declaration, structural nesting, and number and size of sub-
programs. Statement type frequencies represented the structural dependencies of a program. The experiments assumed four types of program statements: assignments, looping statements, if statements, and subprogram calls. Data structure declaration characteristics were not simulated because faults in such structures tend to be caught by the compiler, and because the effects of faults in such statements would be included among those of the four chosen types.

Type, distribution, density, and fault-to-failure relationship parameters influenced the insertion of coding errors. The generator used type information to select the kinds of statements composing the program. Distribution information controlled where faults were located, either clustered in specified functions or scattered randomly throughout the program. Fault-to-failure relationships defined the frequency of failures when faults are encountered at run time.

Test input data depend on the testing environment, operational scenario, testing strategies, test phase, desired coverage, and resources available for testing. In the simulations reported, resource considerations were not addressed. Provisions for test strategies included features for random, directed, functional, mutation, sequencing, and feature testing. Test coverage selection included parameters designating node, branch, and data flow modes.

Projects classify failure attributes by type, severity, and detection status. Investigations so far have treated only failures of a single type and severity.

Debugging effectiveness depended on parameters associated with fault detection, identification, severity, and repair. Each of these, except severity, has correctness and resource dimensions. For example, identification establishes a fault-to-failure correspondence and the time required to make that correspondence.

Computing-environment parameters included all the data required to run the test harness and analyze the failure data. The experiment environment data included machine, language, and workload parameters.

16.4.1.2 Simulated code generation. A code generator may produce simulated code using measured parameters of the actual project (trace-driven), or from generic data taken from a wide variety of project histories (self-driven).

Figure 16.2 illustrates a self-driven code generator architecture. The reported code simulator operates approximately as follows: Given the number of modules and the set of module sizes, the generator creates statements of the specified types according to their given occurrence frequencies, sometimes followed by code that represents a fault of a specified character.
The means for invoking multiple modules and for controlling the depth and length of nested structures were not explicitly revealed in the source references. If you wish to duplicate the simulator for your own experiments you will have to decide upon appropriate models for these characteristics.

It is not necessarily assumed that real faults are uniformly distributed over the program; rather, the program generator can seed faults on either a function-by-function or statement-by-statement basis, according to a distribution by statement type and nesting level. Further, the fault-exposure ratios of each fault need not be the same.

The presence of a real fault in a normal program corresponds to an ersatz element within the simulated program that can cause a failure contingent on a supposed failure characteristic. As the simulated program executes, a statement containing a fault will, with a given probability (the fault-exposure ratio), cause a failure.

But the ersatz failure, when it occurs, is not meant to duplicate the appearance of the real failure; only its occurrence and location are of importance. The injected fault thus needs to raise an exception with information that will identify where, when, and what type of failure has occurred. The reported simulator used a divide-by-zero expression to trigger the fault, which was then trapped by the execution harness via the signal capability of C.

An important step toward extending the utility of the simulation technique would be to make it trace-driven, or adaptive to project measurements as they emerge dynamically, rather than using only the static historic data of the self-driven simulation described above. Fig-
ure 16.3 illustrates how trace data would replace the random selection of statements during program execution.

16.4.1.3 Execution harness. The reported execution harness contains a test driver program that creates an interface between the generated program and its test data, spawns a child process to execute the generated program, and collects execution-time data on the child process separately from that of its ancillary functions, which may not have the same structural characteristics. The returned value of the child process indicated whether the test resulted in failure or terminated naturally.

Simulated faults in the generated program could have been represented in any of a number of ways. The reported experiments used arithmetic overflow. Having detected the failure, the test harness enters the returned information into the failure log for use in locating and removing the fault. The updated program then recompiles and reexecutes.

16.4.1.4 Reliability assessment. The output log provides the execution time of each test run and indicates which runs experienced failures; it also identifies which fault caused the failure. Tools, such as those described in App. A, can use these data to generate tabular and graph-

![Diagram](Image)

**Figure 16.3** Trace-driven artifact simulation of the coding phase.
ical analyses of the failures. Such analyses may include application of any of a number of reliability growth models, maximum likelihood estimates and confidence limits for model parameters, and visual plots of important reliability attributes, such as cumulative failures or present failure intensity versus time.

The reliability assessment function also has available to it the output of the debugging function, which tells which faults were correctly, incorrectly, or incompletely made. At any time, then, the status of remaining faults in the generated program is visible.

### 16.4.2 Results

Reliability investigations using artifact simulation are currently in their formative stage. The fundamental, first-order validations of the equivalence hypotheses are yet in progress. Consequently, the process of evolution has imposed some limitations that will disappear, with time. The fundamental question has been: Do simulated programs in simulated environments exhibit reliability profiles representative of real programs in real environments that have the same parameters?

A software artifact simulation study, [Mayr91], compared (Fig. 16.4) the results of testing a 5000-line C program with the predicted performance using the basic execution time model. These experiments

![Figure 16.4 Simulated code experimental cumulative failures (from [Mayr91]).](image-url)
demonstrated that the order in which failures occurred among statements containing faults closely matched the execution counts for those statements, and that the failure counts correlated with the types of program structures surrounding the faults.

These and other early results tend to confirm that static measures of program structure, error characteristics, and test strategies influence the reliability profiles of simulated and real programs in the same ways.

Artifact simulation studies of the future will continue to quantify the extent to which static parameters relate to reliability dynamics. As the software simulation art evolves, the effects of size, multiple-procedure program structures, multiple failure types, nonuniform fault distributions, and nonstationary parameters on reliability will increasingly become known.

16.5 Rate-Based Simulation Algorithms

The fundamental basis of rate-controlled event process simulation is the representation of a stochastic phenomenon of interest by a time series \( x(t) \) whose behavior depends only on a rate function, call it \( \beta(t) \), where \( \beta(t) \, dt \) acts as the conditional probability that a specified event occurs in the infinitesimal interval \( (t, t + dt) \).

A number of the analytic reliability growth models discussed in Chap. 3 echo this assumption and further assume that events in nonoverlapping time intervals are independent. The processes modeled are thereby Markov processes [Papo65], or nonhomogeneous Poisson processes (NHPP), which are also Markov processes. These include the models proposed by Jeliński and Moranda ([Jeli72]), Goel and Okumoto ([Goel79]), Musa and Okumoto ([Musa84]), Duane ([Duan64]), Littlewood and Verrall ([Litt73]), and Yamada ([Yama83]). Rate functions for these appear in Sec. 16.6.1.

The algorithms described here not only apply to simulating Markov processes, but are capable of simulating processes having time-dependent event-count dependencies and irregular rate functions. These algorithms can simulate a much more general and realistic reliability process than has ever been hypothesized for any analytic model.

The mathematics presented in this section treats general statistical event processes and rate-driven event processes, not merely those believed to describe software failures. As in the analytic models mentioned above, it is only the form of the rate functions and interpretation of parameters that set these models apart as pertaining to software. We begin this specialization formally in the next section and continue it through Sec. 16.7. First, however, we derive the forms of the simulation algorithms.
16.5.1 Event process statistics

If $S_0$ and $S_1$ denote the states of an event $\delta$, $S_0$ in effect before the event and $S_1$ after its occurrence, then a particular member of the stochastic time series defined by $[\beta_0(t), S_0, S_1]$ beginning at time $t = 0$ is a sample function, or realization, of the general rate-based discrete-event stochastic process. The zero subscript on $\beta_0(t)$ signifies the $S_0$, or zero occurrences, starting state.

The statistical behavior of this process is well known: the probability that event $\delta$ will not have occurred prior to a given time $t$ is given by the expression

$$P_0(t) = e^{-\lambda_0(t, 0)}$$  \hspace{1cm} (16.1)

where

$$\lambda_0(t, t_0) = \int_{t_0}^{t} \beta_0(\tau) \, d\tau$$  \hspace{1cm} (16.2)

The form of $\beta_0(t)$ is unrestricted, but generally must satisfy

$$\beta_0(t) \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \lambda_0(\infty, 0) = \infty$$  \hspace{1cm} (16.3)

The first of these prevents the event from occurring at a negative rate, and the second stipulates that the event must eventually occur. If the second condition is violated, there will be a finite probability that the event will never occur.

When the events of interest are failures, $\beta_0(t)$ is often referred to as the process hazard function and $\lambda_0(t, 0)$ is the total hazard. The cumulative distribution function and probability density function for the time of an occurrence are then

$$F_1(t) = 1 - P_0(t)$$  \hspace{1cm} (16.4)

$$f_1(t) = \beta_0(t)e^{-\lambda_0(t, 0)}$$  \hspace{1cm} (16.5)

The mean time of occurrence is

$$E(t) = \int_{0}^{\infty} t\beta_0(t)e^{-\lambda_0(t, 0)} \, dt$$  \hspace{1cm} (16.6)

If $\lambda_0(t, 0)$ is known in closed form, we may sometimes be able to write down and analyze the event probability and mean time of occurrence functions directly. In all but the simplest cases, however, we will require the assistance of a computer. When we cannot express the integrals in closed form, we can still evaluate them using straightforward numerical analysis.
16.5.2 Single-event process simulation

It is rather easy and straightforward to simulate the rate-based single-
discrete-event process, as illustrated in the following computer algo-
rithm (expressed in the C programming language) which returns the
occurrence time:

double single_event(double t, double dt, double (*beta)(double))
{
    int event = 0;

    while (event == 0)
    {
        if (occurs(beta(t) * dt))
            event++;
        t += dt;
    }
    return t;
}

Above, the C language syntax defines a function named
single_event() that will eventually return a double-precision floating-
point value of the time of event occurrence. Starting at time t, and con-
tinuing as long as the event value remains 0, the function monitors the
event status; at the occurrence, event increases by 1, as signified by
the ++ operation, which stops the iteration. Time augments by dt units
each iteration, denoted by the "+=" operation.

In the following we have programmed the occurs(x) operation as a
macro that compares a random() value over [0, 1) with the formal
parameter x, which must be less than unity, thus attaining the speci-
fied conditional probability function. (The extern double designation
declares that random() is in an external library that returns a double-
precision floating-point value.) You may wish to consult [Knut70] for a
discussion of random-number-generation techniques.

extern double random(void);
#define occurs(x) (random() < x)

The particular application determines the form of the user-supplied
rate function beta(t). Any required initialization takes place in the
main() program prior to invocation of the single_event() function. Fig-
ure 16.5 depicts the basic data flow of the overall program.

We must choose the dt in simulations to satisfy all the following
conditions:

1. $dt$ is smaller than the desired time-granularity of the reliability
profile.

2. Variation in $\beta(t)$ over the incremental time intervals $(t, t + dt)$ is
negligible.
3. The chance of multiple event occurrences within a \( dt \) interval is negligible.

4. The magnitude of \( \beta(t) \, dt \) is less than unity at each \( t \) in the interval of interest.

The time complexity of the algorithm is \( O(\beta t/dt) \), where the \( \beta \) component represents the maximum complexity of computing \( \beta(t) \).

We may also simulate the behavior of a nonstochastic* rate-based single-event process merely by altering the algorithm for \texttt{occurs()}\texttt{()}. If \( \beta(t) \) represents the occurrence rate, then the event occurs when its integral reaches unity.

```c
double accumulated_rate;
#define occurs(x) ((accumulated_rate += x) < 1.) \n    then FALSE else TRUE
```

The construction above increments accumulated_rate by \( x \) prior to checking its value; the expression then switches from a false to a true state when the value reaches unity. (The "\" at the end of the line signifies continuation on the next line of the macro.)

### 16.5.3 Recurrent event statistics

If we permitted the iteration in the previous algorithm to continue throughout a given time interval \((0, t)\), then the simulated event could occur a random number of times, which could be counted. We may com-

* This technique also approximates the calculation of the mean occurrence behavior of a stochastic process; however, the method is exact only for the constant-hazard case.
pute the cumulative distribution function $F_n(t)$ that the $n$th occurrence lies in the interval $(0, t)$ as follows: if $t_{n-1}$ has just been observed as the $(n-1)$st event occurrence, then we may treat the interval immediately after $t_{n-1}$ as a new experiment. Translating Eq. (16.1) to the $n$th occurrence interval produces the occurrence distribution function conditioned on $t_{n-1}$,

$$P_{n-1}(t \mid t_{n-1}) = e^{-\lambda_{n-1}(t, t_{n-1})}$$  (16.7)

$$F_n(t \mid t_{n-1}) = 1 - P_{n-1}(t \mid t_{n-1})$$  (16.8)

$$\lambda_k(t, t_k) = \int_{t_k}^{t} \beta_k(\tau) \, d\tau$$  (16.9)

The time dependency retained in Eq. (16.9) reflects the possible non-stationary nature of the event process. Each of the $\beta_k(t)$ functions is subject to the restrictions given in Eq. (16.3); otherwise $F_n(t \mid t_{n-1})$ above must be divided by $1 - P_{n-1}(\infty \mid t_{n-1}) = 1 - e^{-\lambda(t_{n-1})}$. We shall assume these requirements in the remainder of this chapter.

The $n$th occurrence probability densities then follow from differentiation of Eq. (16.8),

$$f_n(t \mid t_{n-1}) = \beta_{n-1}(t)e^{-\lambda_{n-1}(t, t_{n-1})}$$  (16.10)

$$f_n(t) = \beta_{n-1}(t) \int_{0}^{t} e^{-\lambda_{n-1}(\tau, \tau)}f_{n-1}(\tau) \, d\tau$$  (16.11)

the latter being recursively defined, with $t_0$ for the $n = 1$ case defined as 0. The conditional probability displays the same type of statistical behavior seen in Eq. (16.5) for the single-occurrence case above, but operates piecewise on successive intervals between occurrences.

Finally, $F_n(t)$ follows by integration,

$$F_n(t) = \int_{0}^{t} f_n(\tau) \, d\tau$$  (16.12)

When events are modeled as Markov occurrences, the probability $P_n(t)$ that exactly $n$ occurrences appear in the interval $(0, t)$ is known [Taus91] to be of the form

$$P_0(t) = e^{-\lambda_0(t, 0)}$$  (16.13)

$$P_n(t) = \int_{0}^{t} \beta_{n-1}P_{n-1}e^{-\lambda_n(t, \tau)} \, d\tau$$  (16.14)

Mathematically closed-form solutions for these probability functions are rarely* known. General solutions thus require simple, but perhaps

---

* Closed-form solutions for $P_n(t)$ and $f_n(t)$ are known to exist when the process is of the nonhomogeneous Poisson variety, namely, $P_n(t) = \lambda^*(t, 0) \exp(-\lambda(t, 0))!/n!$ and $f_n(t) = \beta(t)\lambda^*(t, 0) \exp(-\lambda(t, 0))!/n!$. 
time-consuming, recursive numerical methods: the time complexity of \( f_n(t \mid t_{n-1}) \) is of order \( O(\beta(t - t_{n-1})/dt) \); \( f_n(t) \) and \( P_n(t) \) are of order \( O(\beta n t/\Delta t) \), and \( F_n(t) \) is also of order \( O(\beta n t/\Delta t) \). The space complexities of these measures are, respectively, \( O(1) \), \( O(t/\Delta t) \), and \( O(t/\Delta t) \).

The expected time of the \( n \)th occurrence follows directly from Eq. (16.11) as a recursive expression,

\[
\bar{t}_n = \int_0^t t \beta_{n-1}(t) \int_0^t e^{-\lambda_{n-1}(\tau)} f_{n-1}(\tau) \, d\tau 
\]  

with time complexity \( O(\beta n t_{n-1}/\Delta t) \) and space complexity \( O(t_{n-1}/\Delta t) \).

### 16.5.4 Recurrent event simulation

Simulation offers a relatively economical alternative in the evaluation of rate-based performance over the more complex numeric integrations of the previous section. The recurrent events algorithm below is a simple extension of the single-occurrence event code that returns the number of occurrences over the time interval \((t_n, t)\). Its computational complexity to the \( n \)th occurrence is only \( O(\beta t_n/\Delta t) \), in constant space:

```c
void recurrent_event(double ta, double t, double dt,
                     double (*beta)(int, double), int *events)
{
    while (ta < t)
    {
        if (occurs(beta(events, ta) * dt))
            ++*events;
        ta += dt;
    }
}
```

The calling program must initialize the `events` parameter to the actual number of occurrences prior to time \( t_n \); `events` will contain the new count after the function returns. (Note that we renamed `events` in the plural to acknowledge that multiple occurrences are being counted.) Figure 16.6 depicts the program data flow structure.

Mathematically, \( \beta_n(t) \) is valid only in the interval \( t_n \leq t < t_{n+1} \) and signifies that \( n \) occurrences of the event have occurred prior to \( t \). The use of `beta(events, t)` in the algorithm acknowledges that the event may recur from time to time and that the occurrence rate function may not only change over time, but also may be sensitive to the number of event occurrences (as well as possibly other influences). The simulation algorithm observes the event occurrence times and may change the `beta()` function as required by the application.
We may also simulate nonstochastic rate-based recurrent-event processes* by making the single-occurrence occurs() function recognize unit crossings of the rate accumulator, as follows:

```c
#define occurs(x) (if ((accumulated_rate += x) < 1.) \ 
               then FALSE else (accumulated_rate -= 1., TRUE))
```

Note that accumulated_rate decrements by unity at each occurrence, signified by the "-=" operation.

### 16.5.5 Secondary event simulation

Another type of event process of interest is when a primary event triggers the occurrence of a secondary event of a different type. For example, producing a unit of code may create a fault in the code.

Notationally, if $p_i$ denotes the probability that the $i$th occurrence of the primary event causes the occurrence of the secondary event, then we may express the probability $P_m^{(2)}(t)$ that $m$ such secondary events have occurred in the interval $(0, t)$ as

$$P_m^{(2)}(t) = \sum_{n=m}^{\infty} p_{m\mid n}(t)P_n(t)$$  \hspace{1cm} (16.16)

---

* This technique, as before, approximates the average occurrence behavior of stochastic recurrent-event processes.
with

\[ p_{m|n} = P(m \text{ secondary events} \mid n \text{ primary events in } (0, t)) \]  
\[ = \sum_{i \in S} p_{i_1} \cdots p_{i_m}(1 - p_{i_{m+1}}) \cdots (1 - p_{i_n}) \]

where the index vector \( i = (i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_n) \) is a permutation of \((1, 2, \ldots, n)\) such that \((i_1, \ldots, i_m)\) extends over all combinations of \(m\) out of \(n\) primary events, a set \(S\) of size \(\binom{n}{m}\). The computational complexity of \(P_{m|n}(t)\) is thus of combinatorial order, and not practical to evaluate in general cases of practical interest. In the special case that \(p_i = p\) is constant, \(p_{m|n}\) reduces to the binomial function,

\[ p_{m|n} = \binom{m}{n} p^m (1 - p)^{n - m} \]

The simulation algorithm for a dependent secondary event process, however, can remain quite general; one merely adds a mapping array \textit{secondary\_event} that relates the primary event to its secondary event and a function \textit{p(i, events, t)} that returns the probability that the primary event triggers the secondary event:

```c
if (occurs(beta(i, events, ta) * dt))
|
    ++events[i];
    if (((j = secondary\_event[i]) && occurs(p(j, events, t))))
    |
        ++events[j];
```

We may similarly treat multiple secondary events emanating from a single primary event at only a moderate increase in algorithm complexity.

### 16.5.6 Limited growth simulation

When the final number \(N\) of occurrences that an event process may reach is prespecified, the normal growth of the event count over time must stop after the \(N\)th occurrence. For example, if there are \(N\) faults to repair, and repairs proceed reasonably, then effort ceases after the last one is fixed.

Simulating this behavior is simple, but must include steps to prevent the event count from overshooting \(N\) when multiple occurrences occasionally take place within a \(dt\) interval. This may be done by altering the event-counting functions, not to exceed prespecified maxima \textit{max\_events}, as follows:

```c
if (events[i] < max\_events[i])
    ++events[i];
```
16.5.7 The general simulation algorithm

You may have already guessed the form of a general rate-based discrete-event process simulator. It is merely the recurrent-event algorithm augmented to accommodate multiple simultaneous events, multiple event categories, secondary events, and growth limits.

The general algorithm below incorporates all of these features. It simulates f event processes over a time interval ta to t using time slices of duration dt; an initialized input array events counts the occurrences, which may not exceed corresponding values in the max_events array; an array event_category contains the mapping of event occurrences into categories, which counts occurrences up to the maxima specified in the max_categories array; and a secondary_event array and p() function control secondary occurrences, as described in Sec. 16.5.5. For readability, the control function name beta() becomes rate(). We also add action() and display() functions, described below.

```c
void simulate(int f, double ta, double t, double dt,
    double (*rate)(int, int *, double),
    int events[], int max_events[],
    int categories[], int max_categories[],
    int event_category[],
    int secondary_event[], double (*p)(int, int *, double),
    void (*action)(int *, double),
    void (*display)(int *, double))
{
    int i, j, k;

    while (ta < t)
    {
        for (i = 0; i < f; i++)
            if (occurs(rate(i, events, ta) * dt))
                if (events[i] < max_events[i])
                    ++events[i];
                    k = event_category[i];
                    if (categories[k] < max_categories[k])
                        ++categories[k];

                if ((j = secondary_event[i]) && occurs(p(j, events, ta))
                    if (events[j] < max_events[j])
                        ++events[j];
                        k = event_category[j];
                        if (categories[k] < max_categories[k])
                            ++categories[k];
                }
        }
    action(events, ta);
```
The `action()` function specifies what takes place when an event occurs. For example, if one category of events represents identified faults and another represents repairs, then `action()` may compute an un repaired fault parameter for `display()`, or it may recompute appropriate `max_events` or `max_categories` bounds. The `action()` functions may well also pass additional parameters, such as `i`, `j`, `k`, and `m`, should these local values be needed to effect the proper change in state.

The `display()` function outputs the simulation status monitors as a profile in time. It may publish only certain parameters of interest, or it may detail the entire reliability state at each `dt`, depending on the time-line information desired by the user. Figure 16.7 shows the overall simulation program data flow.

We must choose the `dt` for the simulation experiments simultaneously to satisfy earlier-stated constraints imposed by each of the event rates. As a consequence, execution may be very slow. Alternatively, we could speed up the algorithm by choosing larger values of `dt` and computing the numbers of multiple events that may occur during each of the larger intervals, as determined by the probability functions of primary and secondary events. It is known, when event occurrences in nonoverlapping intervals are independent (see, e.g., [Taus91]), that primary events are Poisson distributed and secondary events are binomi-
ally distributed. Generally, however, the probability functions are
unknown, even when the rate functions are fairly simple.

But if these probability functions were known, there would be only
slight changes required in the algorithm above: occurs(rate() * dt)
would be replaced by a primary(rate() * dt) function that counts the
random number n of primary event occurrences in the dt interval;
occurs(p()) gets replaced by secondary(n, p()), which counts the
number m of occurrences of secondary events; and events[] augments
by n and m, rather than unity, respectively.

If we desire, for execution-time reasons, a value of dt that is too large
for use in the general algorithm above, but is yet small enough that pri-
mary and secondary event statistics over dt intervals are approxi-
mately Poisson and binomially distributed, respectively, then the
modified algorithm can be applied. We refer to this configuration as the
piecewise-Poisson approximate simulation. Piecewise-Poisson simu-
lations, of course, are valid for all the usual NHPP models, because no
approximations are actually made. We have not yet studied the valid-
ity of the approximation applied to other processes.

16.6 Rate-Based Reliability Simulation

Rate-based reliability simulation is a natural extension of techniques
for analyzing conventional models, because many of these are also rate
(or hazard) based. The underlying processes assumed by these models
are thus the same.

Because of algorithmic simplicity, simulation serves as a powerful
tool not only for analyzing the behaviors of processes assumed to have
complex rate functions, but also for investigating whether the stochas-
tic nature of a project’s measured failure data is typical of that ob-
tained by simulation. We may vary the modeling assumptions until
profiles reach a satisfactory alignment.

The challenge in life-cycle simulation is finding rate functions that
satisfactorily describe all of the activities, not just testing. Such a
model enables optimum planning through trade-offs among allocated
resources, test strategies, etc.

16.6.1 Rate functions
of conventional models

Several published analytic models treat (or approximate) the overall
growth in reliability during the test and fault-removal phases as non-
homogeneous Poisson processes in execution time, while others focus
on Markov execution-time interval statistics. While these may differ
significantly in their assumptions about underlying failure mecha-
nisms, they differ mathematically only in the forms of their rate functions. Some examples are the following:

1. The *Jelinski-Moranda* model [Jeli72] describes statistics of failure time intervals under the presumption that $\beta_n(t) = \beta_0(1 - n/n_0)$, where $n_0$ is the estimated (unknown) number of initial software faults and $\beta_0$ is initial failure rate.

2. The *Goel-Okumoto* model [Goel79] treats an overall reliability growth process with $\beta(t) = n_0 \phi e^{-\lambda t}$, where $n_0$ and $\phi$ are input parameters, $n_0\phi$ being the initial failure rate, and $\phi$ the rate decay factor. Strictly speaking, this rate function violates the conditions on $\lambda(t, 0)$ imposed in Eq. (16.3), because $\lambda_0(\infty, 0) = n_0$ and $P_0(\infty) = e^{-n_0}$. In practicality, $n_0$ is usually fairly large, so the consequences may be negligible.

3. The *Musa-Okumoto* model [Musa84] posits an overall reliability growth process in which $\beta(t) = \beta_0/(1 + \theta t)$, where $\beta_0$ is the initial failure rate and $\theta$ is a rate decay factor. Both $\beta_0$ and $\theta$ are input parameters.

4. The *Duane* model [Duan64] deals with another overall reliability growth model, with $\beta(t) = kbt^{b-1}$, where $k$ and $b$ are input parameters. Equation (16.3) requires that $0 < \beta < 1$.

5. The *Littlewood-Verrall inverse linear* model [Litt73] is an overall reliability growth model with $\beta(t) = \beta_0/\sqrt{1 + \theta t}$ where $\beta_0$ is the initial failure rate and $\theta$ is a rate decay factor.

6. The *Yamada delayed S-shape* model [Yama83] represents still another overall reliability growth model, with $\beta(t) = \phi \gamma te^{1-\gamma t}$, where $\phi$ (the maximum failure rate) and $\gamma$ are input parameters. This rate function, too, violates condition (16.3), as $\lambda_0(\infty, 0) = e\phi\gamma$ and $P_0(\infty) = e^{-\phi\gamma}$; again, when the number of faults is large, the effect is negligible.

You may find further discussions of these models in Chap. 3.

### 16.6.2 Simulator architecture

We have already discussed the algorithm for rate-based simulation. The remaining architectural considerations are characterized by input parameters, event rate functions, event response actions, and output displays. The scope of user requirements should set the level of detail being simulated.

A reliability process simulator should be able to respond to schedules and work plans and to report the performance of subprocesses under the plan. By viewing simulated results, users may then replan as necessary. The simulator described here therefore does not assume specific relationships involving staff, resource, or schedules, but expects these as inputs in the form described in Sec. 16.3.2.
Simulations should also embody interrelationships among project elements. For example, defective specifications should lead to faults in the code unless defects are corrected before coding takes place; missing specifications should introduce even more coding errors; testing should not take place without test cases to consume; repair activity should follow fault identification and isolation; and so on.

A more comprehensive simulation model ([Taus91]) of the reliability process uses about 70 input parameters describing the software project and development environment, together with a project plan of arbitrary length containing activities, resources allocated, and application schedules. This simulator, SoftRel, displays time-line profiles of almost 50 measures of project reliability status and the resources consumed, by activity. The SoftRel tool is included in the Data and Tool Disk.

We shall illustrate the principles of reliability process simulation in a somewhat more simplified example—only 25 input parameters and a project resource schedule are required. You should not regard this example necessarily as an illustration ready for industrial use, but as a framework and means for experimentation, learning, and extension.

In the example (see Sec. 16.7), we simulate only a single category of events for each reliability subprocess. Further, simulations produce only two types of failure events, namely, defects in specification documents and faults in code, all considered to be in the same severity category.

We also simplify the example reliability process not to include document and code reuse and integration, test preparations and the dependencies between testing and test-case availability, outages due to test failures, repair validation, and retesting.

Other, more detailed, simplifications appear in the discussions below.

16.6.2.1 Environment considerations. We know that characteristics of the programming, inspection, test, and operational environments can influence the rates at which activities take place. For simplicity, however, we have eliminated as many of these from the example simulator as seemed reasonable to our goals here. A more refined tool for general-purpose industrial use would, of course, probably include more definitive environmental inputs.

Events, of themselves, carry no intrinsic hazard values. The rates at which events occur depend on a number of environmental and other factors, including the nature of the events themselves. The model must treat event hazards differently in different situations.

Some faults may be easier to discover by inspection than by testing, while for others the opposite may be true. The fault discovery rate in testing normally depends on such parameters as the CPU instruction execution rate, the language expansion factor, the failure-to-fault relationship, and the scheduled CPU hours per calendar day that are
applied. During inspections, on the other hand, fault discovery depends on the discovery-to-fault relationship, the fault density, the inspection rate, and applied effort.

A fault is independent of its means of discovery. The model must therefore realize different hazard-per-fault rates in differing discovery environments, rather than merely assign a specific hazard rate to the fault itself.

16.6.2.2 Subprocess representation. In the example simulator, each activity produces occurrences of one or more uncategorized event types, either primary or secondary. Table 16.1 lists the simulated primary events. Except for test failures, all are goal-oriented processes with limiting values, as shown. Test failures are limited by the current fault hazard function.

Table 16.2 defines the secondary events that occur with a primary event, controlled by an occurrence probability that may depend on a number of combined factors. For example, the number of defects or faults recognized during inspections will not only depend on the inspection efficiency (the fraction of defects recognized when inspected), but also on the density of defects in the material being inspected. All secondary event occurrences are naturally limited in number to the occurrences of their primary events; no other limits are imposed.

16.6.3 Display of results

Internally, a process simulator carries very detailed, fine-grained information on the activities and events under study, of types that are both visible and latent in real projects. In the spirit of simulation, the profiles viewed by humans should appear as if taken from reality.

However, a simulation user may well desire visibility into latent values, such as the numbers of unfound defects and faults, in order to make decisions on subsequent actions. When real project profiles match their corresponding simulation profiles, then the user probably

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 16.1</th>
<th>Reliability Process Primary Events and Limits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary event</td>
<td>Rate control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doc unit created</td>
<td>Build workforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doc unit inspected</td>
<td>Document insp workforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doc defect treated</td>
<td>Document corr workforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code unit created</td>
<td>Coding workforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code unit inspected</td>
<td>Code insp workforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code fault treated</td>
<td>Code corr workforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test failure</td>
<td>Size, faults, cpu, exposure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure analyzed</td>
<td>Analysis workforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fault repair attempt</td>
<td>Repair workforce</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 16.2 Reliability Process Secondary Events, Correspondences, and Controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secondary event</th>
<th>Primary event</th>
<th>Rate control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defect created</td>
<td>Doc unit created</td>
<td>Defect density</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defect recognized</td>
<td>Doc unit inspected</td>
<td>Latent defects, efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defect corrected</td>
<td>Defect treated</td>
<td>Correction efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fault created</td>
<td>Code unit created</td>
<td>Fault density, missing/faulty doc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fault recognized</td>
<td>Code unit inspected</td>
<td>Latent fault density, efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fault corrected</td>
<td>Fault treated</td>
<td>Fault correction efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fault identified</td>
<td>Test failure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fault repaired</td>
<td>Failure analyzed</td>
<td>Id efficiency, fault density</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Repair attempt</td>
<td>Repair efficiency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

expects that the latent behaviors will also agree. But we must not expect latent, model-internal behaviors to be accurate, because they can never be matched with reality.

To some extent, real profiles depend on how projects instrument and organize themselves for reliability measurement. They may record the status of documents and development code only at certain milestones. Other parameters, such as failures, may be logged automatically by the operating system, if detected, or by humans on a daily or weekly basis.

Visible project parameters include (1) the input facts (or assumptions) that define the environment and (2) the measured profiles, such as pages of documentation, lines of code, defects and faults found by inspections, failures, test faults identified, repairs, resources expended, and schedule time.

16.7 The Galileo Project Application

This section describes simulating a real-world project based on data and parameters taken from a subsystem of the Galileo project at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory ([Lyu91a]).

Galileo is an outer planet spacecraft project that began at the start of fiscal year 1977, a mission that was originally entitled “Jupiter Orbiter and Probe,” or JOP. Unlike previous outer solar system missions, the Galileo orbiter was intended to remain in Jovian orbit for an extended interval of time. This would allow observations of variations in planetary and satellite features over time to augment the information obtained by single-observation opportunities afforded by previous fly-by missions. Galileo was launched in October of 1989 and reached the Jovian system in 1995.

There are two major on-board flight computers in the Galileo spacecraft: the Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem (AACS), and the Command and Data System (CDS). A significant portion of each of these systems is embodied in software. This case study focuses on the CDS software reliability profile.
The CDS performs such critical functions as command and control of the spacecraft and the acquisition and transmission of flight data. CDS software selects among the many available telemetry rates and modes, and commands and controls all on-board experiments involving instruments.

The CDS flight software is characterized as a real-time embedded subsystem having high reliability requirements in a project where the mission design was redone* several times. The software consists of about 17,000 lines of assembly language code, with about 1400 pages of documentation, produced over a period of approximately 300 calendar weeks. The project spent 1200 days (in 5-day workweeks) in pretest activities and 420 days (in 7-day workweeks) in test preparation, tests, and rework, for a total of 1620 total days. The actual test period lasted only 280 of the 420 days; the project recorded the failure profile only during this 280-day subsystem software testing period.

16.7.1 Simulation experiments and results

Some of the CDS project parameters needed for simulation were calculated from project records; other values were estimated by project personnel; we chose the remaining values as probably typical of this project, but for which we had no immediately available data. We assigned believed-typical values, for example, to parameters relating to the injection and removal of defects and faults. Thus, even though only a few verifiable parameters were available outside the software testing phase, we nevertheless formed an entire plausible hypothetical model in order to illustrate an end-to-end reliability process.

For lack of better development life-cycle information, we presumed that all CDS events occurred at uniform rates per event, that all activities took place without resource and schedule variations, and that testing required applied CPU resources according to the basic execution-time model.

Observing experiments using the simulator described in [Taus91] led to regressive adjustments of the estimated project rate input parameters. Each experiment profiled the status of defects and faults as random streams; the final parameter values resulted in event profiles typified by those shown in Figs. 16.8 and 16.9. The figures depict the results of a single experiment in simulating defect and fault profiles of the CDS software, sampled at 2-week intervals.

Note the smoothness that appears in the rise of some curves in these figures is due to the regularity of the schedule, not randomness in per-

* Redesigns were necessitated by launch delays due to congressional actions and the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster.
Figure 16.8  Simulated Galileo CDS defects status profile.

Figure 16.9  Simulated Galileo CDS fault status profile.
formance. Performance deviations seem invisible not because they are small, but because they are relatively small, as a result of the law of large numbers. Although we have no CDS data to refute this behavior, we doubt that the assumed constant resource levels reflect reality. A more realistic extension to the case study would have been to introduce irregular schedules, since we know that people rarely dedicate their time exclusively to one single activity at a time. If actual CDS schedule information had been available, we could have input this data into the simulation, whereupon the process statistics would probably have appeared more irregular.

Figure 16.8 displays the experimental defect behavior: injected document errors (E), detected defects (D), remaining defects (E - d), and remaining detected defects (D - d). These profiles appear a little more irregular than do those of documentation and code production, but not much. The documentation appears to contain a sizable number of latent defects; even many of the detected defects appear to have been left uncorrected. Experimental rms deviation in the final defect counts was about 25.

Figure 16.9 shows the experimental fault activity. These profiles exhibit visible randomness, only partially masked by the law of large numbers. The rise in total faults (F) during the code construction activity appears almost linear, again a consequence of a constant-effort schedule. We chose project parameters that prevented the creation of faults by imperfect corrections and repairs.

Correction of faults found in inspections began in week 150 and continued until week 240, removing 162 of them. The plateau in total repaired faults (R) and in total remaining faults (F - R) between weeks 240 and 260 occurred due to staff preparations for testing. At week 260, the test phase began, and failures (f) rose to 341 by week 300. Of these, 284 were repaired (r).

By the end of the 300-week simulated project, almost 10 faults per kiloline of code had been found in inspections and corrected, and another 20 faults per kiloline of code had been uncovered by testing and removed. The latent fault density was about 2 faults per kiloline of code.

Standard deviations computed after conducting many such experiments were about 22 in fault count (F), 30 in faults remaining (F - R), 32 in discovered faults (f), and 25 in remaining discovered faults (f - r).

If the simulation parameters were typical of the CDS project, and had the real CDS project been conducted a number of times, these same ranges of variations in the final status of the CDS artifacts would

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* The law of large numbers governs the rate at which the sample mean of an experiment converges to the distribution mean. For many processes, this is of order $O(1/\sqrt{n})$. 
have been observed. The simulation did not replicate the CDS project behavior, but mirrored the behavior of a CDS-type project.

Although the final fault discovery count seems typical of a CDS-type project, the time profile of the simulation results shown in Fig. 16.10 does not quite seem to match the character of the actual project data. The failure rate seems too high during early tests and too low during the later tests. The actual test resource schedule was certainly not as simple as that used in the simulation.

On the basis of these experiments, it appears that realistic simulation of the general reliability process will require that detailed resource and schedule information will have to be provided to the model. It is important to remember that an actual project will probably not proceed as smoothly as its simulation. Consequently, projects will have to plan and measure their achievements as carefully for simulation as they will for the actual production.

16.7.2 Comparisons with other software reliability models

Figure 16.11 compares the actual CDS subsystem failure data with that obtained from a constant-test-hazard-per-fault simulation. We detailed the testing phase into five subactivities with constant staffing, but having irregular CPU and schedule allocations, as shown in Table 16.3. We obtained these schedule parameters using “eyeball regression” of the
simulator output against the project data (see CDS.DAT on the Data Disk). The fit appears adequate to describe the underlying nature of the failure process (we did not expect an exact fit).

A comparison of failure profile simulation results with predictions of three other models, Jelinski-Moranda (JM), Musa-Okumoto (MO), and Littlewood-Verrall (LV), appears in Fig. 16.12. For better amplification of model differences, the figure displays failures per week, rather than cumulatively. The JM, MO, and LV statistics are one-week-ahead predictions, in which all failure data up to a given week are used to predict the number of failures for the next week.

The figure shows that the CDS simulation behavior is very similar to the noisy actual profile in variability and trends; the simulation could have been used for assessing the CDS reliability status and trends during the entire testing phase. The simulated profile could even have been calculated well prior to the start of testing from schedule and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Accumulated failures</th>
<th>Begin week</th>
<th>End week</th>
<th>Staffing</th>
<th>CPU rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Functional test</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Feature test</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Operation test 1</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Operation test 2</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Operation test 3</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
resource plans. The preceding models could not adequately predict even one week ahead.

16.8 Summary

In many ways, the methods for software reliability assessment reported in this chapter are very satisfying, and in other ways, most frustrating. The techniques provide quantitative measures of software quality that can be used by management to guide progress of a project. The frustration is that progress unveils the depth of our ignorance about system reliability and the dearth of experimental reliability data. We have neither addressed the means for obtaining the best simulation structures nor the number of past examples needed to validate them. Nor have we addressed means for forecasting parameter values for a project from historical data. But ignorance, frustration, and the challenge they inspire are potent motivations for research.

The modeling assumptions required by the two simulation approaches addressed in this chapter are certainly less restrictive, but perhaps more demanding, than those underlying analytic models. Simulation solves software reliability prediction problems by producing programs and data conforming precisely to reliability process assumptions. If simulation profiles differ from actual performance, then the user can adjust the simulation model until an acceptable match with
reality obtains. Simulation thus enables investigations of questions too difficult to be answered analytically.

Tools and environments supporting simulations may offer significant assistance and insight to researchers and practitioners in understanding the effects of various software reliability drivers in evaluating sensitivities of behavior to various modeling assumptions and in forecasting software project status profiles, such as time lines of work products and the progress of testing, fault isolation, repair, validation, and retest efforts.

Attempts to reproduce reliability signatures of real-world projects using simulation have, so far, been encouraging. The results tend to coincide intuitively with how real programs behave, and strengthen the hope that such methods in the future will enable fuller investigations into the relationships between static measures and dynamic performance. Such relationships foretell reliability profiles of programs not yet written.

Problems

16.1 Sketch a C program for the self-driven simulated code generator of Sec. 16.4.1.2. Which method did you use to represent the injected faults?

16.2 Use Eq. (16.10) to derive a closed-form expression for the conditional mean occurrence times \( \hat{t}_n \) when the rate function is independent of time, but depends on the number \( n \) of events (that is, \( \beta_n(t) = \beta_n \)).

16.3 Write a program to calculate the mean by Eq. (16.15) and conditional mean occurrence profiles for the simple, rate-driven recurrent event process in Prob. 16.2.

16.4 Develop a formula for calculating the variance \( \sigma_n^2 = E [(t_n - \hat{t}_n)^2] \) of a rate-driven process. Extend the program in Prob. 16.3 to compute the standard deviation, \( \sigma_n \).

16.5 Use the program of Prob. 16.4 to analyze the behavior of a Jelinski-Moranda rate function \( \beta_n = 1 - n/25 \). Run the program and compare the conditional mean profile with the true mean occurrence time. Is there a significant difference? Plot the mean profiles and \( \pm 1\sigma_n \) event envelopes. Is the expected deviation from the mean significant?

16.6 Write a program to simulate the event process in Prob. 16.5. Plot several simulated random-event profiles. How significant are the differences among the profiles?

16.7 Rewrite the rate function of the program in Probs. 16.5 and 16.6 to analyze the performance of the Musa-Okumoto model. How significant are the dif-
ferences between the output profiles? How do these results compare with those of Probs. 16.5 and 16.6?

16.8 Gather environmental and project data (including the resource schedule) of a simple reliability process in your organization (such as software failures) and simulate it. Compare simulated and measured results. Was it possible to make the two appear as sample functions of the same random process? What changes in the simulator inputs were required?

16.9 Based on comparisons of simulated and actual project profiles, what conclusions can be made on the accuracy of simulation experiments?

16.10 Write the C code for the rate(process, events, t) function of the example simulator from the descriptions given in the discussions of reliability subprocess architectures. The formal parameters are process, the integer index of the event; events, a pointer to the integer array of event counts; and t, the time of the simulation. Indicate how the program consumes staff and computer resources as activities unfold.