1 Public-key encryption

We now turn to the study of public-key encryption. In private-key encryption, we had assumed that Alice and Bob share a random secret key $K \in \{0, 1\}^k$ which is completely unknown to Eve. One practical issue with this setup is that the parties need to get together and agree on this key in a secure environment. While this may be possible in physical settings, it is not clear how this key agreement can be achieved on the internet.

Public-key encryption offers a possible solution to this problem. In public-key encryption, Alice has a pair of keys, a secret key $SK$ and a public key $PK$. The secret key is known only to Alice, while the public key is known to everyone, including Eve. If Bob wants to send a message to Alice, he encrypts it with her public key. Although the public key is sufficient for encryption, it is useless for decryption: The only way to recover the message (or extract any information about it) requires knowledge of the secret key.

We achieved private-key cryptography by starting with an information-theoretic requirement – perfect security – that could be in principle achieved but requires unreasonably large resources in practice. We then relaxed the security requirement in order to obtain a more reasonable implementation. In contrast, public-key cryptography is not even possible to do in a perfect security setting, no matter what the size of the keys.

Defining public-key encryption rigorously is a bit trickier than the private-key case. These complications arise mainly from the problem of choosing the keys. In the private-key setting, we could assume – essentially without loss of generality – that the key is a random string in $\{0, 1\}^k$. In the public-key setting, the keys $PK$ and $SK$ will also be random, but they must also be related in some special way in order to make encryption and decryption complementary to each other. So we will assume that the pair $(PK, SK)$ is generated as the output of a special randomized key generation algorithm $Gen$.

It also happens that in many (but not all) constructions of public-key encryption, plaintexts and ciphertexts do not come from sets like $\{0, 1\}^k$, but rather from some other sets $D$, usually groups. The set $D$ itself is sometimes random.

**Definition 1.** A public-key encryption scheme is a triple of algorithms $(Gen, Enc, Dec)$ where

- $Gen$ is a randomized algorithm that takes no input and produces a pair of keys $(SK, PK)$ (and a domain $D$).
- $Enc$ is a randomized algorithm that takes a public key $PK$ and a message $M \in D$ and outputs a ciphertext $Enc(PK, M)$.
- $Dec$ is an algorithm that takes a secret key $SK$ and a ciphertext $C$ and produces a plaintext $Dec(SK, C)$.
- For every message $M \in D$, $Dec(SK, Enc(PK, M)) = M$.
where \((SK, PK)\) is the output of \(Gen\), with probability one over the randomness of \(Gen\) and \(Enc\).

Let us reflect a bit on how we would apply this definition in a practical scenario. If Bob wants to send a message to Alice, then he would run the encryption, and Alice would run the decryption. But who runs the key generation algorithm \(Gen\)? One possibility is for Alice to run her own key generation, store the secret key in a secure place, and share the public key with Bob (and anyone else who may wish to send her a message). On the internet, maybe she could do this by posting her public key on a web page, for example. But if her channel to Bob is not authenticated – for example if Eve impersonates Alice – then Bob may be operating under the wrong impression that he is encrypting using Alice’s public key, while he may in fact be using someone else’s public key. Various solutions to this key distribution problem have been proposed. At least for now we will assume that the public key is indeed known to everyone.

We now define message-indistinguishability for public-key encryption:

**Definition 2.** A public-key encryption scheme \((Gen, Enc, Dec)\) is \((s, \varepsilon)\) message indistinguishable if for every circuit \(A\) of size \(s\) and every pair of circuits \(M_0, M_1\) of size \(s\),

\[
|\Pr[A(PK, Enc(PK, M_0(PK))) = 1] - \Pr[A(PK, Enc(PK, M_1(PK))) = 1]| \leq \varepsilon
\]

where the randomness is taken over \(Gen, Enc,\) and \(A\).

Notice a difference from the private-key setting: since the adversary is given access to the public key, the challenge messages \(M_0\) and \(M_1\) can also depend on the public key. This is why we model them as circuits.

By giving the adversary access to the public key, we give him the ability to compute arbitrary encryptions of his choice. So in the public-key setting, CPA security reduces to message indistinguishability. An immediate consequence is that any message indistinguishable scheme must be probabilistic.

Also notice that a “perfectly secure” variant of this definition (i.e., with \(s\) arbitrary) can never be achieved, regardless of the key size: Whenever \(M_0 \neq M_1\), for any \(PK\) the possible encryptions \(Enc(PK, M_0)\) and \(Enc(PK, M_1)\) must be disjoint, so a computationally unbounded adversary can always recover the message from its encryption.

How do we construct secure public-key encryption? Ideally, we would like to proceed as in private-key cryptography: We identify a simple primitive, like a pseudorandom generator, that is necessary and sufficient for the construction of public-key encryption and give a scheme assuming the security of the primitive. Unfortunately no such primitive is known in the public-key setting. (In particular, there is evidence that public-key encryption requires more than the existence of pseudorandom generators.)

We will shortly define an object called a trapdoor permutation, a primitive that can be used to construct public-key encryption. However, not all public-key encryption schemes are based on trapdoor permutations. In order to show how public-key encryption schemes look like, we begin by describing a “direct” construction: the El Gamal encryption scheme.
2 The El-Gamal encryption scheme

The El Gamal encryption scheme is based on a computational hardness assumption called the Decisional Diffie Hellman (DDH) assumption. Let \( G \) be a cyclic group of size \( q \) with generator \( g \). We say the \((s,\varepsilon)\) DDH assumption holds for \((G,g)\) if for every circuit of size \( s \),

\[
\left| \Pr_{x,y\sim\mathbb{Z}_q}[A(g^x, g^y, g^{xy}) = 1] - \Pr_{x,y,z\sim\mathbb{Z}_q}[A(g^x, g^y, g^z) = 1] \right| \leq \varepsilon.
\]

The DDH assumption is related to the hardness of taking discrete logarithms. If the discrete logarithm problem in \( G \) was easy – namely, given \( h \) we could find an \( x \) so that \( g^x = h \) – then the DDH assumption would not hold: On input \((a,b,c)\) we take the discrete logs of \( a \) and \( b \) and \( c \) and output 1 if the product of the first two equals the last. This happens with probability 1 on the left, but with probability at most 1/\( q \) on the right.

However, the hardness of computing discrete logarithms is in general not sufficient for \((G,g)\) to satisfy the DDH assumption. For example, when \( p \) is a random prime number, and \( g \) is a generator for \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \), it is believed that the discrete logarithm problem is usually hard in \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \), but it is known that \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) does not satisfy the DDH assumption.

One way to obtain a group for which the DDH assumption may be true is like this. Choose a number \( p \) where both \( p \) and \( q = (p - 1)/2 \) are prime numbers. Let \( h \) be a generator for \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) and \( Q_p \) be the subgroup of \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) generated by \( g = h^2 \). Then \( Q_p \) is a cyclic group of order \( q \) and it is plausible that the DDH assumption holds with high probability for such groups.\(^1\)

We now describe the El Gamal encryption scheme. Next time we will argue that this scheme is message indistinguishable provided that the DDH assumption holds:

**Key Generation:** Choose a random prime \( p \), so that \((p - 1)/2 \) is also prime, \( p \leq 2^k \), and a random \( h \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \). Let \( g = h^2 \). Choose a random \( x \leq (p - 1)/2 \). Output the pair \( SK = (p, g, x) \), \( PK = (p, g, g^x) \).

**Encryption:** \( Enc((p,g,g^2),M) = (g^r, g^{xr} \cdot M) \) where \( M \in Q \) and \( r \) is chosen at random from \( \mathbb{Z}_q \).

**Decryption:** \( Dec((p,g,x),(C,C')) = C'/C^x \).

It is easy to see that this scheme is correct. To argue that it is secure, we need to show that for every pair of small circuits \( M_0, M_1 \), the distributions \((p,g,g^x,g^r,g^{xr} \cdot M_0)\) and \((p,g,g^x,g^r,g^{xr} \cdot M_1)\) are indistinguishable, where \( M_0 \) and \( M_1 \) may depend on the public key \((p,g,g^x)\). To do this, we will compare both distributions with the distribution \((p,g,g^x,g^r,g^2)\) and argue that if they are indistinguishable, we can break the DDH assumption.

**Claim 3.** Suppose the \((s,\varepsilon)\) DDH holds with probability \( 1 - \varepsilon \) over the choice of the subgroup \( Q_p \) of \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \). Then El Gamal encryption is \((s/2,4\varepsilon)\) message indistinguishable.

**Proof.** Suppose not. Then there is are circuits \( A, M_0, M_1 \) of size \( s/2 \) so that

\[
\left| \Pr[A(p,g,g^x,g^r,g^{xr} \cdot M_0) = 1] - \Pr[A(p,g,g^x,g^r,g^{xr} \cdot M_1) = 1] \right| > 4\varepsilon.
\]

\(^1\)Such numbers are called safe primes. It isn’t known if there are an infinite number of them, but it is believed that a random number in \( \{0,1\}^n \) is a safe prime with probability about \( 1/n^2 \).
(To keep notation simple, we omit the input \(PK = (p, g, g^x)\) of \(M_0\) and \(M_1\) from this description.) By a hybrid argument, for at least one \(b \in \{0, 1\}\) we must have:

\[
|\Pr[A(p, g, g^x, g^r, g^{xr} \cdot M_b) = 1] - \Pr[A(p, g, g^x, g^z) = 1]| > 2\varepsilon.
\]

Then

\[
\Pr_{p,g}[|\Pr_{x,r}[A(p, g, g^x, g^r, g^{xr} \cdot M_b) = 1] - \Pr_{x,r,z}[A(p, g, g^x, g^r, g^z) = 1]| > \varepsilon] > \varepsilon.
\]

Fix a pair \((p, g)\) for which the expression inside is greater than \(\varepsilon\). For this pair \((p, g)\), we give a circuit \(B\) that \((s, \varepsilon)\) breaks the DDH assumption: On input \((a, b, c)\), output \(A(p, g, g^a, b, c \cdot M_b(p, g, a))\). Then \(B\) has size \(s\) and

\[
\Pr_{x,r}[B(g^x, g^r, g^{xr}) = 1] = \Pr[A(p, g, g^x, g^r, g^{xr} \cdot M_b) = 1]
\]

while

\[
\Pr_{x,r,z}[B(g^x, g^r, g^z) = 1] = \Pr[A(p, g, g^x, g^r, g^z \cdot M_b) = 1] = \Pr[A(p, g, g^x, g^r, g^z) = 1]
\]

because \(g^z\) is uniformly random in \(Q\) and independent of \(x\) and \(r\). It follows that the \((s, \varepsilon)\) DDH assumption fails to hold for more than \(\varepsilon\) of the pairs \((p, g)\).

There is one implementation issue regarding El Gamal encryption: The messages reside in a group \(Q_p\), which is a subgroup of \(\mathbb{Z}_p^*\). How do we represent bit strings as elements of \(Q_p\)? In our example, \(Q_p\) consists of the quadratic residues in \(\mathbb{Z}_p^*\) (namely those elements that are perfect squares), and so a message coming from the set \(\{0, \ldots, q-1\}\) can be represented by its square modulo \(p\). To decode the message from its square, we need to take square roots modulo \(p\).

How do we do this? Given \(y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*\), we need to find \(x\) so that \(x^2 = y\). Since \(y\) is a quadratic residue, it must be that \(y = h^{2t}\) for some \(t\), so we need to solve the equation \(x^2 = h^{2t}\). This equation has two solutions given by \(x = \pm h^t\). It looks like in order to find \(x\), we need to know the discrete log of \(y\). But there is a trick that avoids taking discrete logs: Since \(h^{p-1} = 1\), we have that \(h^{2t} = h^{(p+1)t}\), and so the square roots of \(h^{2t}\) are the values \(\pm h^{(p+1)t/2} = \pm y^{(p+1)/4}\). So taking the square root of \(y\) is the same as raising \(y\) to the power \((p+1)/4\) (as long as \(p\) and \(q = (p-1)/2\) are both primes).

### 3 Trapdoor permutations

Let’s go back to generic public-key encryption and consider intuitively the requirements that a public-key scheme should satisfy. For this, it will help to think of decryption as the “inverse” of encryption:

- For every public key, encryption should be easy to compute.
- If we know the public key but do not know the secret key, encryption should be hard to invert.
- If we know the secret key, encryption becomes easy to invert.

Notice that these requirements subsume the requirements of a one-way function: Easy to compute, but hard to invert. However there is an additional requirement: Encryption should become easy to
invert in the presence of some extra information, the secret key. We call this a trapdoor: it allows us to magically go back where we came from.

This suggests that the core of public-key encryption is the existence of “trapdoor functions”. Unfortunately it turns out that this intuition is not quite correct. However, if the function happens to be a permutation, then we can indeed obtain public-key encryption.

Definition 4. A family of functions $f_{PK}$ is a $(s, \varepsilon)$ trapdoor permutation family with key generation algorithm $Gen$ and trapdoor inversion algorithm $Inv$ if

- For every possible output $(SK, PK)$ of $Gen$, the function $f_{PK}$ is a permutation.
- For every circuit $A$ of size at most $s$, $Pr[A(PK, f_{PK}(x)) = x] \leq \varepsilon$ where the probability is taken over the choice of $(SK, PK) \sim Gen$ and $x$ chosen at random from the domain of $f_{PK}$.
- For every pair $(SK, PK) \sim Gen$ and every $x$ in the domain of $f_{PK}$, $Inv(SK, f_{PK}(x)) = x$.

Trapdoor permutations are somewhat difficult to come by. We now describe a conjectured construction.

**Quadratic residuosity** To describe this construction we need a bit of algebra. As before, let $p$ be a prime number so that $(p - 1)/2$ is also a prime, $h$ a generator of $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$, and $Q_p \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ the subgroup of quadratic residues generated by $h^2$. To get some intuition about $Q_p$, let’s look at $\mathbb{Z}_{11}^*$:

![Diagram of quadratic residues](attachment:diagram.png)

The arrows indicate the graph of the map $x \rightarrow x^2$. The numbers in bold are the quadratic residues. Notice that each quadratic residue has two square roots: One inside $Q_p$ (the black incoming edge) and one outside $Q_p$ (the gray incoming edge). In particular, the map $x \rightarrow x^2$ is a permutation of $Q_p$. However, this permutation is easy to invert: As we said before, the square roots of $y$ are $\pm y((p+1)/4)$.

We can generalize these observations to every group $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ where $(p - 1)/2$ is an odd number. If $h$ is a generator for $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$, the set of quadratic residues is $Q_p = \{h^2, h^4, \ldots, h^{p-1} = 1\}$. All these elements have distinct squares: For if $(h^{2a})^2 = (h^{2b})^2$, then $p - 1$ must divide $4a - 4b$, so $(p - 1)/2$ must divide $a - b$, and so $a = b$. Therefore the map $f(x) = x^2$ is a permutation of $Q_p$, and its inverse is the map $y \rightarrow y((p+1)/4)$.

Now suppose $n = pq$ is a product of two distinct prime numbers, and let us assume that both $(p - 1)/2$ and $(q - 1)/2$ are odd numbers. The group $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$ consists of those numbers that have a multiplicative inverse modulo $n$. These are all the numbers that are not multiples of $p$ or multiples of $q$ (or both). The elements of $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$ can be identified with pairs of elements, one in $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$, the other

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2One reason for this is that a “trapdoor function” is a deterministic object, while encryption may (and should) be randomized.
one in \( \mathbb{Z}_q^* \) by the representation map \( u \to (u \mod p, u \mod q) \). This is a one-to-one map from \( \mathbb{Z}_n^* \) to \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \times \mathbb{Z}_q^* \).

What do the quadratic residues \( Q_n \) of \( \mathbb{Z}_n^* \) look like? First, notice that if \( y \in Q_p \) and \( z \in Q_q \), then the pair \((y, z)\) is in \( Q_n \), and it has four square roots represented by the pairs

\[
(-y^{(p+1)/4}, -z^{(q+1)/4}) \quad (-y^{(p+1)/4}, z^{(q+1)/4}) \quad (y^{(p+1)/4}, -z^{(q+1)/4}) \quad (y^{(p+1)/4}, z^{(q+1)/4})
\]

Since \( Q_p \times Q_q \) has a quarter of the size of \( \mathbb{Z}_n^* \), and each pair \((y, z)\) in \( Q_p \times Q_q \) has exactly four square roots, it follows that \( Q_n \) contains exactly those elements that are represented by pairs in \( Q_p \times Q_q \). Moreover, exactly one of these four square roots comes from \( Q_p \times Q_q \), so the map \( x \to x^2 \) is a permutation of \( Q_n \). This is our candidate one-way permutation:

Let \( p \) and \( q \) be prime numbers where \((p - 1)/2\) and \((q - 1)/2\) are also prime and \( Q_n \) be the subgroup of quadratic residues of \( \mathbb{Z}_n^* \). Then the map \( f(x) = x^2 \) is a permutation over \( Q_n \).

Is the permutation \( f \) one-way? Suppose there is a circuit \( A \) that inverts \( f \) with probability \( \varepsilon \). Now choose a random \( x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* \) and look at the output of \( A(x^2) \). Since \( x^2 \) is a random element of \( \mathbb{Z}_n^* \), with probability \( \varepsilon \), \( A(x^2) \) will output a square root \( u \) of \( x^2 \). But didn’t we already know a square root? Yes, but there are four, and \( u \) could be different from the square root we already know. In fact, conditioned on \( x^2 \) (represented by \((y, z)\)), \( x \) is equally likely to take any of the four values

\[
(-y^{(p+1)/4}, -z^{(q+1)/4}) \quad (-y^{(p+1)/4}, z^{(q+1)/4}) \quad (y^{(p+1)/4}, -z^{(q+1)/4}) \quad (y^{(p+1)/4}, z^{(q+1)/4}).
\]

To be specific, let us assume that \( u = A(x^2) \) is represented by \((y^{(p+1)/4}, z^{(q+1)/4})\). Then with probability at least \( 1/4 \), \( x \) is represented by \((y^{(p+1)/4}, -z^{(q+1)/4})\), and therefore \( x + u \) is represented by \((2y^{(p+1)/4}, 0)\), which is a multiple of \( q \). Then the GCD of \( n \) and \( x + u \) must equal \( q \).

To summarize, we just showed that if \( A \) inverts \( f \) on an \( \varepsilon \)-fraction of its outputs, then the following circuit produces one of the factors of \( n \) with probability at least \( \varepsilon/4 \):

On input \( n = pq \):

Choose \( x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* \) at random.

Run \( A(x^2) \) to obtain \( u \). Output the GCD of \( n \) and \( x + u \).

By repeating this algorithm \( O(1/\varepsilon) \) times, we can increase the chances of finding a factor of \( n \) from \( \varepsilon/4 \) to a constant. So if the permutation \( f \) is easy to invert, then it is almost equally easy to factor the number \( n \).

It is believed that factoring numbers like \( n \) may be computationally intractable:

**Hardness of factoring assumption** (for parameters \((s, \varepsilon)\)): Let \( p \neq q \) be random primes between 1 and \( 2^k \) so that \((p - 1)/2\) and \((q - 1)/2\) are also prime. Then for every circuit \( A \) of size \( s \),

\[
\Pr_{A,p,q}[A(pq) = p \text{ or } A(pq) = q] \leq \varepsilon.
\]

The best known factoring algorithm (for numbers of any form) appears to run in time about \( 2^{\sqrt{k}} \). Using a quantum algorithm, it is possible to factor in time polynomial in \( k \). The quantum
algorithm, however, does not have a scalable implementation, and it is a matter of debate whether it is a credible threat to the hardness of factoring assumption.

The hardness of inverting \( f \) relies heavily on the assumption that the factors of \( n \) are difficult to find. If the factors of \( n \) are known, it turns out that \( f \) is easy to invert. We already know that the square roots of \( u \in Q_n \) are the numbers represented by

\[
(-y^{(p+1)/4}, -z^{(q+1)/4}) \quad (-y^{(p+1)/4}, z^{(q+1)/4}) \quad (y^{(p+1)/4}, -z^{(q+1)/4}) \quad (y^{(p+1)/4}, z^{(q+1)/4}).
\]

To find a square root of \( u \), all that remains is to figure out which numbers in \( \mathbb{Z}_n^* \) are represented by these pairs (and which one of them resides in \( Q_n \), which we can figure out by attempting another square root). If we know \( p \) and \( q \), there is a formula for inverting such representations:

\[
\text{if } (y, z) = (u \mod p, u \mod q), \text{ then } u = zp \cdot (p^{-1} \mod q) + yq \cdot (q^{-1} \mod p).
\]

To summarize, the following algorithm inverts the map \( f(x) = x^2 \) given access to \( p \) and \( q \):

\[
\text{Inv}((p, q), u):
\]

Let \((y, z) = (u \mod p, u \mod q)\).

Compute the representations \( u_1, u_2, u_3, u_4 \) of \((\pm y^{(p+1)/4}, \pm z^{(q+1)/4})\).

If \( u_2 \neq u \), return \text{error} \((u \not\in Q_n)\).

Return \( u_i \), where \( i \) is the unique index for which \( \text{Inv}((p, q), u_i) \) does not return \text{error}.

In conclusion, it is plausible that the function \( f \) is a trapdoor permutation: It is hard to invert assuming the hardness of factoring assumption, but easy to invert if we are given the factorization of \( n \). Let \( \text{Gen} \) be an algorithm that chooses random primes \( p, q \leq 2^k, p \neq q \) where \( (p - 1)/2 \) and \( (q - 1)/2 \) are also prime, and outputs the pair \( SK = (p, q), PK = n \). We just argued that

**Theorem 5.** Assume the \((s, \varepsilon)\) hardness of factoring assumption holds. Then \( \{f : Q_n \to Q_n\} \) is an \((s/k^{O(1)}, \Omega(\varepsilon))\) trapdoor permutation family with key generation algorithm \( \text{Gen} \) and trapdoor inversion algorithm \( \text{Inv} \).

## 4 Public-key encryption from trapdoor permutations

In the private-key setting, our encryption schemes were naturally based on pseudorandom generators. A pseudorandom generator, in turn, can be constructed from a one-way permutation and a hard-core bit. Once one bit of pseudorandomness is obtained, the length of the output can be increased by carefully constructed iterative applications of the pseudorandom generator.

An analogous sequence of transformations can be used in the public-key setting to obtain public-key encryption from trapdoor permutations. To illustrate this, we begin by designing a one-way encryption scheme from a trapdoor permutation and its hard-core bit.

**Definition 6.** Let \( \{f_{PK} : D_{PK} \to D_{PK}\} \) be a family of trapdoor permutations with key generation \( \text{Gen} \) and trapdoor inversion \( \text{Inv} \). A function family \( \{h_{PK} : D_{PK} \to \{0, 1\}\} \) is a \((s, \varepsilon)\) hard-core bit family for \( \{f_{PK}\} \) if for every circuit \( P \) of size \( s \),

\[
\Pr_{PK, x}[P(PK, f_{PK}(x)) = h_{PK}(x)] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon.
\]
Just as in the case of one-way permutations, if $h_{PK}$ is a hardcore bit for $f_{PK}$, the pair $(f_{PK}(x), h_{PK}(x))$ is difficult to distinguish from the pair $(y, b)$, where $y$ is a random element in the domain of $f_{PK}$ and $b$ is a random bit. This suggests that $h_{PK}(x)$ can be used to hide a one-bit message $M \in \{0,1\}$ via the following encryption scheme:

$$\text{Enc}(PK, M) = (f_{PK}(R), h_{PK}(R) + M) \quad \text{where } R \sim D_{PK} \text{ is random}$$

$$\text{Dec}(SK, (Y, B)) = B + h_{PK}(\text{Inv}(SK, Y)).$$

**Claim 7.** Assume $\{h_{PK}\}$ is an $(s, \varepsilon)$ hardcore bit family for $\{f_{PK}\}$. Then $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is $(s/2 - O(1), 2\varepsilon)$ message indistinguishable.

**Proof.** If not, then there are circuits $A, M_0, M_1$ of size $s/2 - O(1)$ so that

$$|\Pr[A(PK, f_{PK}(R), h_{PK}(R) + M_0(PK))] = 1] - \Pr[A(PK, f_{PK}(R), h_{PK}(R) + M_1(PK))] = 1]| > \varepsilon$$

so there is some $b \in \{0,1\}$ for which

$$|\Pr[A(PK, f_{PK}(R), h_{PK}(R) + M_b(PK))] = 1] - \Pr[A(PK, f_{PK}(R), B) = 1]| > \varepsilon$$

where $B \sim \{0,1\}$ is a random bit. Let $D$ be a circuit that on input $(PK, y, c)$ returns $A(PK, y, c + M_b(PK))$. Then $D$ has size $s - O(1)$ and

$$|\Pr[D(PK, f_{PK}(R), h_{PK}(R)) = 1] - \Pr[D(PK, f_{PK}(R), B) = 1]| > \varepsilon.$$

By the same argument that we used in the last lecture, using $D$ we can construct a predictor $P$ of size $s$ for which

$$\Pr[P(PK, f_{PK}(x)) = h_{PK}(x)] > \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$$

violating our assumption. \hfill \Box

One annoying thing about this scheme is that it can only encrypt single bits. To do better, we need to obtain multiple hardcore bits, which we can do using the same approach that allowed us to extend the output of pseudorandom generators. To encrypt messages in $\{0,1\}^m$, we use the following encryption:

$$\text{Enc}(PK, M) = (f_{PK}^{(m)}(R), h_{PK}(R) + M_1, h_{PK}(f_{PK}(R)) + M_2, \ldots, h_{PK}(f_{PK}^{(m-1)}(R)) + M_m)$$

where $f^{(i)}(x) = f(f(\ldots f(x)\ldots))$ a total of $i$ times. The proof of security is very similar to the proof of Theorem 9 from Lecture 2.

Under the hardness of factoring assumption, there are several known hardcore bits for the function $f(n, x) = x^2 \mod n$. For example, the least significant bit of $x$ is known to be a hardcore bit.

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3We will assume that the public key is implicitly contained in the secret key.