第八屆「環太平洋多代理研究國際工作坊」(PRIMA 2005) 2005年9月28日於馬來西亞舉行。活動只限獲邀人士參與，與會者均為對工作坊的主題卓有貢獻的專業人士。
Many multi-agent interactions, like auctions and negotiations, can be modeled as games. Game theory is a tool to analyze these multi-agent applications as games and to analyze how agents should interact in these applications, which helps design intelligent agents. In many of the existing solutions to these multi-agent applications, the concept of risk is used, but it is not formally defined in game theory. On the other hand, in many games, pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist, while mixed or behavioral strategy equilibria are not appropriate, as mixed or behavioral strategies are probabilistic in nature, and it is possible that a low utility results in particular (sub)games. Worse, mixed or behavioral strategies cannot properly model the autonomous nature of agents. Furthermore, trigger strategies for repeated games are based on punishment, which is sometimes not as good as making decisions based on experience. However, making decisions based on past experience is not represented in existing game theory concepts. To solve the problems, we introduce the concept of risk strategies in repeated 2x2 risk games. We find that players can get better payoffs by using risk strategy than using mixed or behavioral strategies in repeated 2x2 risk games. In addition, we find that a game without pure strategy Nash equilibrium can converge to a new type of equilibrium, which we define as risk strategy equilibrium.