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Abstract:
Traditional Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks do not provide service
differentiation and incentive for users. Consequently, users can
easily access information without contributing any
information or service to a P2P community. This leads to the
``free-riding'' problem and consequently, most of the information
requests are directed toward a small number of P2P nodes which are
willing to share information or to provide service, hence, the ``tragedy of
the commons'' occurs.
The aim of this work is to provide service differentiation
based on the amount of services each node has provided to a P2P community.
Since the differentiation is based on the amount of contribution,
this encourages all nodes to share information/services in a P2P network.
We first introduce a resource distribution mechanism for
all information sharing nodes.
This mechanism is a distributed algorithm which has a linear time complexity
and guarantees the ``Pareto-optimal'' resource allocation.
In addition, the mechanism not only distributes resources
in a way to increase the aggregated utility of the whole network,
but also provides incentive for other nodes in the P2P network to share information.
Secondly, we model the whole resource request and distribution
process as a competition game between all competing nodes.
We show that this game has a Nash equilibrium and has a
collusion-proof feature.
To realize this game, we propose a protocol such that all competing nodes
can interact with the information providing node such that the Nash
equilibra can be reached efficiently and dynamically.
We present the architecture of ``auditing authority'' to
securely maintain contributions of all nodes.
Experiments are carried out to illustrate that
the protocol provides service differentiation
and induces incentive for nodes to share information or to provide service.
Publications:
- T.B. Ma, C.M. Lee, John C.S. Lui, David K.Y. Yau.
``Incentive and Service Differentiation in P2P Networks: A Game
Theoretic Approach''
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 14(5), October, 2006.
- T.B. Ma, Sam C.M. Lee, John C.S. Lui, David K.Y. Yau.
``Incentive P2P Networks: A Protocol to Encourage Information
Sharing and Contribution'',
Performance Evaluation Review, 31(2), September, 2003.
- T.B. Ma, Sam C.M. Lee, John C.S. Lui, David K.Y. Yau.
``A Game Theoretic Approach to Provide Incentive and Service
Differentiation in P2P Networks''.
ACM SIGMETRICS/PERFORMANCE, June, 2004. ( AR: 33/265=12% )
- T.B. Ma, Sam C.M. Lee, John C.S. Lui, David K.Y. Yau.
``An Incentive Mechanism for P2P Networks''.
The 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
(ICDCS), Tokyo, Japan, March 23-26, 2004. ( AR: 84/475=17% )
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