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Abstract:
Distributed wireless mesh network technology is ready for public
deployment in the near future. Yet without an incentive system, one should
not assume private, self-interested wireless nodes to cooperate in the
packet forwarding service. This paper studies the use of pricing as a
mechanism to encourage nodes to participate in a wireless mesh network.
Our focus is on the ``economic behavior'' of nodes in the network---the
access point, wireless relaying nodes, and clients--- in their pricing and
purchasing strategies. We use a ``game theoretic approach'' to analyze
their interactions from one-hop to multi-hop network and when the access
point has an unlimited or limited uplink bandwidth. The important results
we show are that the access point and relaying wireless nodes will adopt a
simple, yet optimal, fixed-rate pricing strategy in a multi-hop network in
which the access point has an unlimited uplink bandwidth. But, the access
price grows exponentially with the hop distance between a client and the
access point, which may limit the ``scalability'' of the wireless mesh
network. In the case that the access point has a limited uplink bandwidth,
the optimal strategy is for the access point to vary the access charge and
may even interrupt service to connecting clients. To this end, we focus on
the access point adopting a more practical ``fixed-rate, non-interrupted
service'' model and propose an algorithm based on the Markovian decision
theory to devise the optimal pricing strategy. We believe this work will
shed light on the deployment and pricing issues of distributed wireless
mesh networks.
Publications:
- Ray K. Lam, Dah-Ming Chiu, John C.S. Lui
``On the Access Pricing and Network Scaling Issues of Wireless Mesh Networks''
IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
(ICDCS), 2006. ( AR: 75/536=14% )
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